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IMPERFECT GIFTS AS DECLARATIONS OF
TRUST: AN UNAPOLOGETIC ANOMALY
By SARAJANE LovE*
One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system
recognizing the individualistic institution of private property
and granting to the owner the power to determine his succes-
sors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should
favor giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power.'
INTRODUCTION
Ethel Yahuda was a widow who wished to give a library of
Hebrew manuscripts collected by her and her late husband to
the Hebrew University in Israel. She announced her gift at a
public luncheon in Israel and upon her return to the United
States began to catalogue and crate the collection for shipment
to the university. Her intention to go forward with the gift was
repeatedly expressed to friends and to the university. Unfor-
tunately, she died during the long preparation necessary to
complete the transfer. The university sued her estate, claiming
that the library belonged to it, even though it was in Mrs.
Yahuda's possession at her death. Despite strong and uncon-
tradicted evidence that Mrs. Yahuda had intentionally exer-
cised her power to determine her successor in ownership to the
library in favor of the university, the appellate court's ruling
all but insured that the books would become part of her estate.
2
In another case3 that may at first blush seem to be unre-
lated to the case involving the Yahuda library, Mr. Davis, a
wealthy lawyer, wrote and signed a statement indicating that
he was holding certain stock in trust for Eleanor Wilson, a
young woman who was a close family friend. The stock was to
be delivered to Ms. Wilson upon his death, if she survived him.
Mr. Davis' action was contemporaneous with Ms. Wilson's en-
* Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law at Camden. B.A., Emory University;
J.D., University of Georgia.
I Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1941).
2 Hebrew Univ. Ass'n v. Nye, 169 A.2d 641 (Conn. 1961). After a retrial, the
University prevailed. See note 186, infra.
3 Knagenhjelm v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 114 A. 5 (R.I. 1921).
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gagement announcement to Mr. Knagenhjelm, whom she mar-
ried. Unlike Mrs. Yahuda, who behaved consistently with her
stated intent to make a gift of the library, Mr. Davis did not
always act as if he were holding the stock in trust for the named
beneficiary. Among other acts, he gave 25 of the shares identi-
fied in his writing to his butler. At his death, only 85 percent
of the stock remained in his possession. Again, litigation en-
sued over ownership of the remaining stock, but this time the
owner's stated desires as expressed in the writing were given
effect by the court; Mrs. Knagenhjelm was entitled to the stock
which remained.
Can these two cases be reconciled if one takes as the start-
ing point the "fundamental proposition" that our private prop-
erty system respects an owner's wishes to give away his prop-
erty to whomever he pleases? There is no doubt that Mrs.
Yahuda's admirable charitable wishes would have been vio-
lated if the books in her library had become part of her resi-
duary estate. There were no countervailing facts which would
have justified overriding her intent. From the standpoint of the
guiding principle which has long undergirded the law of gratui-
tous transfers and from the standpoint of the facts in these two
cases, it is hard to understand why Eleanor Wilson Knage-
nhjelm got her stock but the Hebrew University was, for a
while, denied the library which Mrs. Yahuda sincerely wanted
it to enjoy.
Nevertheless, those who are familiar with the law of gra-
tuitous transfers will no doubt reconcile the results of these two
cases by pointing out that there are several distinct ways to
carry out one's desire to make a gratuitous transfer, each with
its own requirements. Mrs. Yahuda attempted to make an inter
vivos "gift" to the university. A gift will be upheld only if it is
"delivered." This normally requires a physical transfer of the
object of the gift from the donor to the donee. Therefore, Mrs.
Yahuda's attempted gift should fail since there was no physical
transfer of the library. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, did not
attempt to make a gift, but rather declared a trust. His written
declaration that he held the stock in trust for Mrs. Knagen-
hjelm operated to change his relationship to the stock from
that of owner to that of a trustee for the benefit of Mrs.
Knagenhjelm. He complied with all of the legal requirements
necessary to accomplish his chosen means of effectuating a
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transfer and the court therefore recognized Mrs. Knagen-
hjelm's interest in the stock.
This article will address circumstances under which
"gifts" of personalty, made without legal supervision by lay
people like Ethel Yahuda, should be construed as declarations
of trust in order to carry out the wishes of the property owner.
The declaration of trust doctrine may salvage some attempted
gift transactions because the property which is the subject of
the trust need not be delivered to the trust beneficiary.
I. GIFrs AND DECLARATIONS OF TRUST: THE DOCTRINAL
FRAMEWORK
The primary obstacle that prevents using the declaration
of trust to circumvent the delivery requirement is the century-
old rule of Richards v. Delbridge:1 Imperfect gifts will not be
saved by construing them as declarations of trust. Obviously,
the Richards rule imposes a rather formidable barrier to the
approach to imperfect gifts suggested in the introduction. Sub-
sequent sections of this article will examine in more depth the
assumptions and policy objectives upon which the Richards
rule is based. However, to appreciate that discussion, it is nec-
essary to examine the evolution of the declaration of trust and
the Richards rule.
A. Origins of the Richards Rule
1. Ex parte Pye5
The stage for Richards v. Delbridge was set in 1811 by Lord
Chancellor Eldon's decision in Ex parte Pye. In Pye, a gentle-
man named Mowbray attempted to make provisions for a lady
friend by purchasing an annuity for her benefit. The motiva-
tion for the gift, one may speculate, was related to the fact that
the beneficiary, Marie, was also the mother of three children
by Mowbray, who was married to another woman. To accom-
plish his scheme, Mowbray instructed his agent in Paris to
purchase the annuity in Marie's name. Marie was married and
insane, so the agent purchased the annuity in Mowbray's name
instead. When Mowbray learned of this, he sent a power of
L.R. 18 Eq. 11, 15 (1874).
'34 Eng. Rep. 271 (Ch. 1811).
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attorney authorizing the agent to transfer the annuity to Marie.
The transfer was subsequently made. Meanwhile - but with-
out the agent's knowledge - Mowbray had died in England.
Placing aside the issue of agency and the Master's finding that
under French law the exercise of the power was valid under
these circumstances, Lord Eldon concluded that Mowbray's
written power of attorney constituted a declaration that he
held the annuity in trust for Marie.
6
Lord Eldon's brief statement about the annuity in his
opinion does not reveal the reasoning that produced his conclu-
sion.7 Many reputable scholars think that the facts suggest no
more than an imperfect gift of the annuity.8 It is possible that
Lord Eldon did not reason at all, that he merely decided that
he wanted to uphold the transaction and struck upon the decla-
ration of trust as the means of doing so. But this seems un-
likely. The declaration of trust, when made gratuitously, had
not been upheld previously.9 It is improbable that so conserva-
Id. at 274.
Vice-Chancellor Stuart later implied that the holding was an intellectual accom-
plishment vi et armis by attributing the decision to the "extraordinary power" of Lord
Eldon's mind.
In some cases this Court has gone extremely far, and particularly in that of
Ex parte Pye, Ex parte Dubost, where Lord Eldon went extraordinarily far
certainly, to hold a gift valid which was very imperfect. But Lord Eldon
found his way, with that extraordinary power which he possessed, to satisfy
his mind that a power of attorney by the donor to receive the dividends could
be construed to amount to a declaration of trust.
Forrest v. Forrest, L.R. 34 Eq. 428, 432 (1865).
3 E. CLARK, L. LusKy & A. MURPHY, GRAnTurrous TRsFERs 484-85 (2d ed. 1977);
G. PALMER, TRuSm AND SUCCESSION 304 (2d ed. 1968); A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRusTs §
31, at 250 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ScOTr]; Arnold, The Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. Rav. 800, 819 n.56 (1931).
1 Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 467,
474 (1917). Pye's significance in the development of trust law is more profound than
might appear. The fact that a gratuitous declaration of trust was not recognized until
the relatively late date of 1811 is an indication of the similarities underlying the
development of trusts in equity and the common law's development of contract law.
The close resemblance between a trust and a contract or agreement is seen in the more
typical case of trust creation involving two parties; one, the settlor, conveys property
to another, the trustee, to be held in trust for a beneficiary. The transaction between
the settlor and trustee can easily be viewed as a contract; the settlor conveys the
property in return for the trustee's agreement to use the property as directed by the
settlor. F. MArrLAND, EQurrY 28, 54, 116 (2d ed. 1936). Although chancery gave relief
on behalf of the beneficiary (or cestui que use) when the trustee defaulted, it was the
wrong done to the settlor which twinged the chancellor's conscience and led to equity's
intervention. This intervention upon petition of the beneficiary had evolved by the
[Vol. 67
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tive a chancellor as Lord Eldon would have created a new legal
device without some rational thought.10 More probably, Lord
Eldon must have viewed Mowbray's power of attorney with the
common trust situation in mind: Property is transferred to a
trustee, who holds legal title, to hold in trust for a beneficiary,
who is the equitable owner." The surrounding facts, showing
early sixteenth century into "a wholly unique form of ownership which the chancellor
had thus developed from a conscientious obligation of a very personal kind." 4 W.
HoLnSwowRm, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 433 (3d ed. 1924). The beneficiary's "unique
form of ownership" of the trust property, however, was apparently insufficient grounds
for equitable intervention when the misbehaving trustee was an owner who had de-
clared himself trustee. Beneficiaries of such trusts were still regarded as mere
"volunteers" whom equity would not assist in the absence of consideration, or some-
thing that equity regarded as its equivalent. See Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13
ILL. L. Rzy. 667 (1918). (The sealed covenant to stand seized of real property to the
use of a blood relative was apparently the only commonly enforced declaration of trust;
consideration in this transaction took the unique form of a blood relationship and
natural love and affection. Id. at 671, 688-89; CLARK, LUsKY & MURPHY, supra note 8,
at 449.50.) In Pye, then, for the first time equity acted solely to protect the interest of
a beneficiary who was a volunteer. The declaration of trust, made without considera-
tion, had created an equitable interest that equity would enforce for its own sake.
1, T. PLucKNrr, A CONcisE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 706-07 (5th ed. 1956).
Plucknett notes that "[Lord Eldon's] scrupulous character would not permit him to
decide a case until he had exhausted all its possibilities and examined it from every
angle." Id. at 707. See 13 W. HoLswoa'rH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 619-26 (1952).
" See note 9, supra for a discussion of the development of the trust concept.
Exactly what this equitable ownership is and what its ramifications are remains a
matter of some uncertainty and debate to this day. The debate concerns whether the
beneficiary's interest is an in rem interest in the trust res itself, or whether the benefici-
ary has merely an equitable claim in personam against the trustee. The debate is more
than merely academic. The nature of the beneficiary's interest figures importantly in
the resolution of a number of questions such as taxation, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 5 (1937) (trust beneficiary who assigned portions of his income interest is not
subject to federal tax on income from the assigned interest - assignments transfer
equitable interests in the trust corpus, not choses in action); jurisdiction, e.g., Jones
v. Jones, 25 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1942) (absent husband's future interest in local trust is an
equitable property interest within court's jurisdiction in proceeding by wife to enforce
maintenance); and applicability of statutes, e.g., Arnold v. Hall, 129 P. 914 (Wash.
1913) (creation of an express trust of land comes within statute of frauds provision
requiring a deed for " '[a]ll conveyances of real estate or of any interest therein' ")
(quoting a Washington statute). Scott argues vigorously for the view that the benefici-
ary has a property interest in the trust res. 2 Scorr § 130; Scott, The Importance of
the Trust, 39 COLO. L. Rxv. 177 (1967); Scott, The Nature of the Interest of the Cestui
Que Trust, 17 CoLUm. L. IRxv. 269 (1917). Bogert seems to favor this view. See 2 G.
BOGERT, TRusTs AND TiRusTTas § 183 (2d ed. 1965). On the other side, adhering to the
view that the beneficiary's property consists only of an in personam chose in action
against the trustee, see F. MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 23, 29-30, 106-52; 4 R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF RaL PROPERTY 515 (Rohan ed. 1949); Stone, supra note 9. Not surpris-
ingly, Pye plays some part in this debate. Scott cites the case in support of his view
that "the courts regard the transaction as a transfer of a beneficial interest rather than
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the intent with which the power of attorney was executed, ap-
parently indicated to Lord Eldon that Mowbray was claiming
no equitable or beneficial interest in the annuity, even though
legal title stood in his name. Since he was claiming no benefi-
cial interest, he must have mentally transferred it to Marie; the
executed power of attorney was the external manifestation of
his state of mind. Viewed in this manner, the transaction had
accomplished the same result as a transfer in trust would have
accomplished; Mowbray had legal title as trustee and Marie
had the beneficial interest.
In two subsequent cases, chancery followed the approach
of Pye and upheld, as declarations of trust, gratuitous transac-
tions which in usual layman's or lawyer's parlance might well
have been labeled gifts and which, as so labeled, would have
failed for want of delivery. In Richardson v. Richardson,12 a
deed of assignment, ineffective to convey legal title,13 was held
as the creation of an obligation," Scott, supra, 17 CoLum. L. REv. at 270 & n.7, while
Stone dismisses the gratuitous declaration of trust as an "anomalous doctrine" contra-
dicting his belief that the beneficiary's rights "[arise] out of obligation." Stone, supra,
17 COLUM. L. REv. at 474 & n.21.
'2 L.R. 3 Eq. 686 (1867).
13 English courts had long recognized the validity of a deed of gift to transfer title
to a chattel, but they were far more reluctant than American courts to allow gifts by
deed of written choses in action such as the promissory notes at issue in Richardson.
See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Chases inAction
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 568, 571-72 (1926) (earlier
installments of Mechem's article appeared in the same volume beginning at pages 341
and 457). They even refused to recognize that a chose in action could be transferred
gratuitously by delivery of the written instrument which evidenced it. Id. The transfer
of an intangible chose in action presented difficulties for the judges who labored under
the conception that the transfer of rights required a transfer of the thing in which the
rights were held. 2 F. PoLLOcK & F. MArrILAND, Tim HisTORY op ENGLISH LAw 84, 180-
81, 226 (2d ed. 1898). This difficulty was avoided by viewing the assignment as a
revocable power of attorney. Rundell, Gifts of Chases in Action, 27 YALE L.J. 643, 643
(1918). Assignments were held to be irrevocable and enforced in equity only (1) if made
for consideration, Id. at 644, or (2) if they were gifts causa mortis of specialities. Id. at
649 & n.35. (Rundell provides an explanation for the seeming irrationality of the
distinction between gifts causa mortis and gifts inter vivos of choses in action. But see
Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action, 27 L.Q. Rav. 326, 331, 338-39 (1911)).
Pye and Richardson can be viewed as attempts to harmonize, through circumvention,
the disparate treatment of gifts inter vivos and gifts causa mortis of choses in action,
and also as an attempt to allow them to be made by deed. Rundell, supra, at 651-52.
Rundell's analysis also sheds yet another possible light on these cases. He attributes
equity's development of the valid gift causa mortis of a chose in action to a desire to
carry out the will of a deceased donor. It is perhaps not coincidental that he sees this
theme "clearly" in a decision by Lord Eldon, Duffield v. Elwes, 4 Eng. Rep. 959 (1827).
Rundell, supra at 650-51. Although, technically, Pye and Richardson did not involve
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to have conveyed equitable title in some promissory notes to
the assignee. The holding that the assignment constituted a
declaration of trust was based upon a conception of the instru-
ment as a transfer of equitable title. Vice-Chancellor Wood
stated, "I do not know in what way the assignor could have
more effectually declared that she was a trustee of the property
for [the assignee]."' 4 Three years later in Morgan v.
Malleson, '5 Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls, found a trust of
a £ 1000 bond to have been declared when its owner handed a
signed and attested memorandum to the beneficiary. The
memorandum stated, "I hereby give and make over to Dr. Mor-
ris an India bond, No. D., 506, value f£ 1000, as some token for
all his very kind attention to me during illness.""6 Lord Rom-
illy's cursory opinion shows that he is not the least bit troubled
by a semantic argument that the transferor's use of the word
"give" dictates that the transaction be treated as a gift which
would have required delivery of the bond itself.
2. Richards v. Delbridge'
7
The tendency of the chancery courts to construe undelivered
gifts as declarations of trust when they were backed by strong
gifts causa mortis, in both cases the donor was deceased and the gift seems to have
been part of the overall scheme for disposition of property at death. This aspect is less
obvious in Pye than in Richardson, where the deed was dated four days before the
donor's death and purported to convey all of her personal estate. L.R. 3 Eq. at 686-87.
Ereli has pieced together the facts of Pye to make a plausible argument that the
annuity in that case was planned with the donor's will provisions in mind. Ereli, The
Trust: Salvation by Muddle, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 190, 225 (1964). What is particularly
interesting in these cases, and in the development of the doctrine of the assignability
of choses in action, is that equity was evolving novel doctrines in order to fulfill the
owner's power to determine his successor in ownership. See note 1 supra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of this motive of equity as a "fundamental principle."
Needless to say, this principle becomes more compelling when the owner is dead and
unable to respond to or to accomodate the legal rules which threaten to thwart his
expressed desires.
, L.R. 3 Eq. at 695.
's L.R. 10 Eq. 475 (1870).
"Id. Like the deed in Richardson, the written instrument in Morgan was ineffec-
tive to transfer the bond, a chose in action. See note 13 supra. An additional problem
in the case was that the written instrument was apparently not under seal. A deed was
operative to transfer title by virtue of its seal; the efficacy of an unsealed written
instrument to transfer a title by gift was a much later development. See Mechem,
supra note 13, at 576-86. As in Pye and Richardson, the declaration of trust was applied
in Morgan to a transfer made by a deceased person before his death.
'1 L.R. 18 Eq. 11 (1874).
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evidence of the transferor's intent and corroborated by the cir-
cumstances was halted by Sir George Jessel's strongly worded
opinion in Richards v. Delbridge. The attempted gift there,
evidenced by a memorandum which had been delivered to the
mother of the intended beneficiary, probably constituted a
substantial portion of the deceased transferor's' 8 estate. Sir
George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, accepted as his governing
principle the "very simple one" that the transfer of legal owner-
ship without consideration, in other words, a "gift," must be
sharply distinguished from a declaration of trust. The "true
distinction" between the two depends, he said, upon the inten-
tion expressed by the transferor. Did he express an intention
to become a trustee or an intention "to give over property to
another, and not retain it in [his] own hands for any purpose,
fiduciary or otherwise"?'9 Although Sir George's exposition of
the governing principle implies that actions of the transferor
are relevant in determining intention," he focused exclusively
on the language of the memorandum to find that a present gift
was intended. Furthermore, he suggested broadly that words
such as "give," "grant," "convey," and "assign" should always
be construed as a manifestation of the intention to make an
absolute gift.2' Morgan v.* Malleson and Richardson v.
Richardson, therefore, were wrongly decided.22 "If the decisions
,1 Throughout this article, the original deceased owner of the property which is
claimed to have been transferred will be referred to as a "transferor" in order to provide
a frame of reference for the reader's comprehension of the facts of cases. This practice
will avoid possible disorientation that could arise from alternating terminology, de-
pending upon the holdings of cases, among descriptions such as "alleged donor,"
"thwarted donor," "alleged settlor," etc.
" L. R. 18 Eq. at 14-15.
[T]he legal owner of the property may, by one or other of the modes
recognized as amounting to a valid declaration of trust, constitute himself a
trustee, and without an actual transfer of the legal title, may so deal with
the property as to deprive himself of its beneficial ownership, and declare
that he will hold it from that time forward on trust for the other person.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 14-15.
12 Id. at 14-15. Sir George Jessel's unequivocal denunciation of Lord Romilly's
construction of the memorandum in Morgan is cast in a curious light by the fact that
as Queen's Counsel, he represented Dr. Morris, the transferee who prevailed in
Morgan. His argument in Morgan, as stated in the reports, was that the memorandum
was a good declaration of trust, citing Richardson as authority. Although the opinion
in Richards, criticizing Morgan and Richardson, professes to be dictated by case law
precedent which brought Morgan and Richardson into question, Jessel leaves no doubt
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. . . were right, there never could be a case where an expression
of a present gift would not amount to an effectual declaration
of trust, which would be carrying the doctrine on that subject
too far." The holding that imperfect gifts would not be per-
fected by construing them as declarations of trust was quickly
adopted by courts in the United States.24 Some years later, the
Restatement of Trusts incorporated the reasoning of Richards
into its statement of prevailing trust law.
25
B. Gratuitous Declarations of Trust: The Anomaly
The gratuitous declaration of trust has survived the criticism
that has been visited upon Lord Eldon's interpretation of the
facts in Pye, the case which gave birth to it, and the limitations
on its use imposed by Richards; it maintains its vitality as a
valid legal device in England and this country.26 Perhaps its
most familiar use is as a will substitute by an owner who wants
to retain the use and enjoyment of property for life while mak-
ing it possible for someone else to own the property after his
death without going through the expense and delay of probate.
This desire can be accomplished by a gratuitous declaration of
trust with various powers and interests reserved to the settlor.
When so used, it is almost always pursuant to the advice of a
about his true feelings: "[Iif it were my duty to decide the matter for the first time, I
should lay down the law in the same way." L.R. 18 Eq. at 14.
Jessel's rigid insistence upon a strict distinction between gift and trust intent was
typical of his approach to the law. One criticism that was made of his accomplishments
as a judge was his inability to appreciate subtleties and nuances. 16 W. HoLwswoRru,
A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW 124-25 (1966).
2 L.R. 18 Eq. at 15.
Considering, however, that equity has already broken in so far upon the
legal conception of a gift without any better reason that is discoverable than
a mere difference of terminology, the consequence here held out in terrorem
does not seem very formidable at all. In fact the two cases impugned merely
carried the doctrine of equity to its logical conclusions ....
Labatt, The Inconsistencies of the Laws of Gifts, 29 Am. L. REv. 361, 370 (1895).
11 Labatt, supra note 23, at 370 & n.2. An exception was Kentucky. See Ginn's
Adm'x v. Ginn's Adm'r, 32 S.W.2d 971, 972 (Ky. 1930) ("An imperfect gift may be
enforced as a trust when it possesses all the elements thereof and the proof is clear and
undoubted.") But see Frazier v. Hudson, 130 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1939).
2 "If the owner of property makes a conveyance inter vivos of the property to
another person to be held by him for his own benefit and the conveyance is not effective
to transfer the property, no trust is created." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 31
(1959) [hereinafter cited as RESrATEmENT]. See also id., comments a and b.
N 1 Scorr § 28; RESTATEmENT § 28.
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lawyer or a financial counselor and its creation is accomplished
by the execution of somewhat formal written instruments.
The ceremony or formality that often attends the creation
of a declaration of trust, however, is not a doctrinal prerequisite
to the validity of the trust. One of the most remarkable things
about Lord Eldon's creation is the ease and simplicity with
which it may be created. Unless the trust is one of land, no deed
or writing is required at all." The beneficiary need not give any
consideration to the settlor, nor is it necessary for the settlor
physically to transfer or "deliver" anything at all to the benefi-
ciary. 28 In fact, the declaration of trust can be valid even if the
beneficiary has not been given notice of his good fortune.29 Fur-
thermore, and perhaps most critical to the thesis here, there are
no particular "magic" words necessary for the trust's crea-
" In most states, the statute of frauds requires that trusts of land be proved by a
writing. 2 A. ConmN, CoNTRAS § 401 (1950); 1 Sco'rr § 40.1; RESTATEMENT §§ 39, 40
and comments thereto. See also 4 R. PowELL, supra note 11, at 509. This article will
not purport to deal with declarations of trust of land, largely because a thorough
exegesis of the judicial gloss on the statute of frauds would be too large a distraction
from the central focus of the article. The judicially evolved rules for taking gratuitous
transactions out from under the statute of frauds have been dealt with elsewhere. See
2 A. CoRsiN, supra at § 441 (1950). The constructive and resulting trusts doctrines have
also been applied to oral trusts unenforceable under the statute of frauds, but primarily
where the settlor has transferred the land to another to hold as trustee for the settlor
or for another beneficiary. See generally RESTATEMENT §§ 44, 45; 1 ScoTt §§ 44, 45;
Ames, Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land,
20 HARv. L. REv. 549 (1907); Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforcible Express
Trusts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 237 (1928); Stone, Resulting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds,
6 CoLuM. L. REv. 326 (1906).
Additional problems encountered in declarations of trusts of land are the questions
of whether they are valid when created gratuitously, and if so, whether the Statute of
Uses executes them if they are passive. Despite the theoretical problems of the validity
of gratuitous trusts of land, caused by the convoluted development of the mechanisms
for transferring land, courts have enforced them. 1 Scorr § 28.1. As for the Statute of
Uses, Scott maintains that it will not operate on a passive gratuitous declared trust of
land. Id. § 68.
For an ambitious attempt to use trust law to interrelate the operation of the
statutes of frauds, statutes of wills, and the requirement of delivery in deciding cases
of gratuitous transfers, see Ereli, supra note 13. Some of the cases cited and discussed
in this article nevertheless involve trusts or gifts of land; to the extent that there was
an issue of what the owner's intent was, it should not make any difference whether
the property involved was realty or personalty.
n 1 ScoT § 28, at 238.
" Id. at §§ 24.2, 36; RESTATEMENT § 36. However, the settlor's failure to communi-
cate the creation of a trust to someone may raise a question as to the intended finality
of his words or acts. 1 Scorr § 24.2, at 200, § 36, at 293; RESTATEMENT § 24, comment
c and § 36, comment b.
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tion;10 the settlor may declare a trust without even knowing
exactly what a trust is.31 Professor Scott has observed that a
declaration of trust is "the simplest method by which one can
give to another an interest in property. . . All that is neces-
sary is that the owner of property should manifest an intention
to hold the property in trust.
'3 2
The validity of the informally-created gratuitous declara-
tion of trust, especially when created orally, has been perceived
as anomalous when compared with the more rigid requirements
for effecting an outright gift.
If A says, "I give or have given the beneficial interest in
such and such a chattel to B," the beneficial interest is at
once completely vested in B.
If, on the other hand, A says, "I have given or give my
entire interest in such and such a chattel to B," this state-
ment will not of itself operate to vest that interest in B, unless
the various other requisites of a legal gift, according to the
nature of the chattel, are present.3
If the rigid requirements for effectuating a gift - particularly
delivery" - are viewed to be valid, it is to be expected that
1 Scorr § 24; RrSTATEMNT § 24 (2).
1 ScoTr § 23; RESrATEMENT § 23, comment a.
n 1 Scovr § 28, at 238.
Labatt, supra note 23, at 363. See generally Annot., 96 A.L.R. 383 (1935).
Delivery is the most vexatious requirement associated with gifts of personalty.
Although this requirement sounds simple enough, it has been the obstacle to judicial
confirmation of intended transfers of property in numerous reported cases. The case
involving Ethel Yahuda's attempted gift, related in the introduction, is not an isolated
phenomenon.
The nature and substance of the delivery requirement, and the necessity of it, have
been often and vigorously debated. Maitland attributed the connection between trans-
fer of ownership and transfer of physical possession to "old impotencies of mind...
which perdure long after they have ceased to be the only conceivable rules." Maitland,
7e Mystery of Seisin, 2 L. Q. Rzv. 481, 495 (1886). But even as Maitland was writing,
the requirement of delivery was about to be "authoritatively reaffirmed," Mechem,
aupra note 13, at 341, in Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 57 (1890), in which Lord Esher
expressed a common sense view that, "The one cannot give, according to the ordinary
meaning of the word, without giving; the other cannot accept then and there such a
giving without then and there receiving the thing given." Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
Lord Esher's reasoning is virtually identical to the thought patterns Maitland critically
described in his writing four years earlier. "You cannot give what you have not got: -
this seems clear; but put just the right accent on the words give and got, and we have
reverted to an old way of thinking. You can't give a thing if you haven't got that thing,
and you haven't got that thing if some one else has got it." Maitland, supra, at 489-90
(emphasis in original).
Mechem's classic article justified the delivery requirement as embodying more
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some discomfort will be expressed with the declaration of trust,
which allows an owner to accomplish practically the same end
without any formal requirements. Indeed, shortly after Pye,
Lord Chancellor Cranworth recoiled at its "unfortunate" doc-
trine. 31 This anomalous aspect of the declaration of trust con-
tinues to draw occasional criticism or comment," but for the
most part it has been ignored because of a general belief that
truly informal declarations of trust, such as orally declared
ones, rarely ever occur. "The average layman has no conception
of the trust as a means of conveyance," 37 hence informal decla-
rations of trust "need not be considered of any marked signifi-
cance in the gift-making habits of human beings. '38 Since the
device is rarely used by "average" people to accomplish gifts,
than just a common sense observation about the "ordinary" meaning of the word
"give." Mechem articulated three useful functions which the act of delivery performs.
See notes 100-01 and accompanying text infra for these functions. When delivery is
absent from an attempted gratuitous transfer, these functions also have not been
performed, and thus the transaction should not be upheld, at least in the normal or
usual situation. Viewed from the functional standpoint, the common law requirement
of delivery is neither an anachronistic reflection of feudal mentality nor a simple
description of what usually happens when a gift is made. Rather delivery is elevated
to a formality with strong policy underpinnings, see Mechem, supra note 13, at 342,
not at all unlike the policies that led to the legislative imposition of formalities through
the Statute of Frauds and Statute of Wills.
Mechem's analysis did not silence completely the critics or reformists of the deliv-
ery requirement. See, e.g., Rohan, The Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of
Gifts, 38 IbN. L.J. 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rohan I]; Rohan, Some Problems of
Constructive Delivery, Agency and Proof in Gift Litigation, 38 IND. L.J. 470 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Rohan II]. However, it may well have given the requirement
renewed credibility and assured its continuing vitality in the law of gifts. It may also
have strengthened the tendency of courts to maintain steadfastly the distinction be-
tween imperfect gifts and declarations of trust. A gift struck down because of the
absence of delivery could be laid on the altar of a rule that was now understood to have
the compelling force of policy behind it.
" Jones v. Lock, L.R. 1 Ch. App. 25, 28 (1865).
u Labatt was thoroughly perplexed by the inconsistency and commented at length
on it. He could propose no solution to it other than the need of a legislative cure.
Labatt, supra note 23. Mechem thought that "if either rule ought to be changed in
the interests of consistency, it should be the equitable and not the legal rule." Mechem,
supra note 13, at 352. Scott, too, expresses some dissatisfaction with the equitable rule.
"It is indeed arguable that the lack of formalities required for the creation of a trust is
unwise, since there is danger that the courts will be persuaded to find a declaration of
trust where none was intended." 1 Scorr § 31, at 249. See Gribbel v. Gribbel, 17 A.2d
892, 895 (Pa. 1941); Note, The Necessity of Delivery in Gifts of Personal Property, 24
COLUM. L. Rav. 767 (1924); Note, Revocability of a Gratuitous Assignment of Part of
a Pecuniary Legacy, 39 HARv. L. Ray. 368 (1926).
" Mechem, supra note 13, at 352.
Is Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 17.
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it does not'threaten to undermine the delivery formality. Thus,
the inconsistency between gifts and declarations of trust is
largely a paper one with little existence outside of treatises and
law review articles. The unrelenting application of Richards, or
perhaps more precisely, the uncritical acceptance of Jessel's
insistence on a rigid dichotomy between gift intent and trust
intent, has meant, as a practical matter, that the informal
declaration of trust of personal property has little utility as a
device for sustaining the layman's intent to dispose of his prop-
erty.
It is difficult to escape the feeling that there is a paradox
here. The gratuitous declaration of trust is a legal concept
adapted to accomplish the simple and normal human impulse
of giving; it is said to be the simplest way of effectuating that
impulse.3 1 Therefore it would seem to have great potential for
application to the actions of "average" people who conduct
most of their everyday affairs without consulting lawyers or
legal scholars. Yet virtually the only uncontroversial applica-
tion of the declaration of trust doctrine in a gratuitous setting
is in situations where the declaration was a rather formal, com-
plete document signed by the settlor and probably drafted by
lawyers.
Three interrelated explanations for this paradox come to
mind, each to be examined in turn in succeeding sections of
this article. The first is the assumption to which this article has
already alluded, that the average layman almost always at-
tempts a gift rather than declares a trust. This assumption
operates in tandem with religious recitations of the Richards
rule to foreclose serious consideration of facts which might indi-
cate that an "average" layman has unknowingly declared a
trust. Second, underlying the superficiality of the first reason,
is the commonly expressed belief that the lack of doctrinally
imposed formalities poses the threat of careless, unwise use of
the device to uphold gratuitous transactions, thereby under-
mining the formality of delivery in gift law.40 Because courts
have shown little receptiveness to wholesale relaxation or out-
right abolition of the formality of delivery, its continued exist-
ence will be taken as a given. But an examination of the pur-
l Scorr, § 28, at 238.
0 Mechem, supra note 13, at 352.53; 1 Scorr § 31, at 249-51.
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poses behind delivery will show that the declaration of trust
doctrine can be applied in a manner consistent with those pur-
poses. A third explanation is that creating a trust is really not
as simple as Scott suggests when he writes, "All that is neces-
sary is that the owner of the property should manifest an inten-
tion to hold the property in trust."41 Although this verbaliza-
tion seems intended to make the proposition sound simple,
simple it is not. The trust is an enigmatic concept, and courts
will undoubtedly face a difficult task when they undertake to
extract trust intent from actions taken and words spoken or
written by laymen who have attempted a gratuitous transfer.
The last section of the article will examine the trust concept
and attempt to relate it to some of the recurring factors and
events in the imperfect gift cases which may point to a trust
rather than a gift construction.
H. THE ELUSIVENESS OF INTENT
In applying Richards to imperfect gift cases, courts con-
tinue to reflect Sir George Jessel's view that there is a striking
and decipherable difference between the intent to make a gift
and the intent to declare a trust. Fundamental to the task
undertaken in this article is the view that this is an overly
technical and often unrealistic distinction when applied to at-
tempted transfers by laymen. It seems to assume that laymen
are schooled in the same abstract mental processes that are
necessary for a mastery of the legal profession.
Gulliver and Tilson observed many years ago that human
behavior does not always fall neatly into legal categories. 2 This
is especially so when legal categorization turns on intent, as it
is said to do in the case of gifts and trusts. Intent must be
inferred from overt, observable, and observed actions and
words which constitute "behavior." Even uncontradicted evi-
dence may not precisely reveal the intent of the actor. Indeed,
as some have admitted, in many cases the intent being sought
is nonexistent. 3
11 1 ScOTr § 28, at 238.
41 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 1.
a GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 173-76 (2d ed. 1921). One court
described its dilemma thusly:
If the testatrix did not think about the matter, it is difficult to say that she
had an intent with respect to it. In that case the court is looking for a black
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The discovery of intent which underlies an attempted dis-
position of property is made doubly complicated by the fact
that the transferor is rarely available to testify. In cases involv-
ing testamentary dispositions, the transferor is dead. Even in
the imperfect gift cases where the dispute is over an alleged
inter vivos transaction, the litigation generally occurs after the
death of the transferor."
The conundrum of intent is well illustrated by cases in
which an inter vivos transaction is challenged on the grounds
that it is essentially a testamentary transfer. The classification
of the event as either inter vivos or testamentary dictates, of
course, whether formalities of the will statutes or requirements
for inter vivos transfers govern. This classification is said to
turn on whether the transferor "intended" that no interest
should pass "until at or after his death." 5 Although courts still
purport to apply this doctrinal test, struggling sometimes at
length to ascertain the moment when title passed, the test is,
as Gulliver and Tilson concluded, "extremely flexible" and
subject to being manipulated "almost at will."" That being the
case, it approaches naivet6 to cling to a conviction that, behind
all of the verbiage, the ascertainment of intent actually con-
trols the outcome of the cases, or even that there is always an
intent to be discovered. "Unless corrupted by legal reasoning,
the donor would never have imagined or contemplated that his
intent could control such a fluidity of title."4
The fragility of the intent that is said to underlie the dis-
tinction between inter vivos and testamentary dispositions
ought also be acknowledged to exist in the subclassification of
hat in a dark room; if the court locates it there at all, it will be on its own
head and not because of any light left by the last will and testament.
Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund, 73 A.2d 119 (N.H. 1950). The problem of categoriz-
ing a transaction as a gift or a trust is virtually identical to the problem of construing
wills, which these two sources are addressing. Scott recognizes that the sought-after
intent may be impossible to find. 1 ScoTr § 31.1, at 258. See also Mechem, supra note
13, at 588-89. See generally, Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUm. L.
REv. 381 (1941).
" Mechem, supra note 13, at 350 n.23. There are a few cases involving an alleged
transferor who is alive and protesting the transfer, but these cases are obviously outside
the pale of the general philosophy of effectuating the owner's intent, which is the
perspective from which this article is written.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 18; RESTATEMENT § 56.
" Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 18.
Ereli, supra note 13, at 224.
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inter vivos transfers into gifts and declarations of trust. It is
fallacious to assume that since the layman transferor is intel-
lectually acquainted with a concept which, if asked, he would
undoubtedly call a "gift," and since he is intellectually igno-
rant of that rather remarkable legal device called a "trust,"
then his state of mind, which determines the rules which gov-
ern the transaction and ultimately its very validity, must have
been to make a gift and not to declare a trust. Far too often it
has been assumed that inter vivos transactions which are not
"formal," lawyer-drafted trusts are attempted gifts rather than
declarations of trust, without recognizing that there is a gray
area between the well-defined extremes of these two catego-
ries.48 In this gray area, the difference between the two is often
defined in terms of what kind of title, legal or equitable, the
transferor intended to convey; that intent is thoroughly as eva-
nescent as the intent which controls when title is passed.
Perhaps this problem can be illustrated by posing a hypo-
thetical, but not atypical, situation. Some years ago, A, who is
recently deceased, began to experience a decline in health. Her
husband was deceased and her children were all grown and had
family responsibilites of their own. A kindly neighbor, B, began
to look in on A. As A's health grew steadily worse, B's care and
attention for her increased. Two years ago, A decided that her
gratitude alone was an insufficient reward for B's kindness. She
had no will and had no intention of making one and she cor-
rectly assumed that B could claim no part of her estate at
death. A therefore visited her safe deposit box and placed some
of the securities there in an envelope. On the envelope, dated
and signed, she identified the securities by issuer and serial
number and wrote that they belonged to B. She told B, "I want
you to have my stock. It is yours and I've seen to it that you
will have it when I die." At her death, the securities identified
on the outside of the envelope were found inside the envelope
in A's safe deposit box. The dividend checks had been mailed
" Labatt recognized a "thin line" between a gift and a declaration of trust. La-
batt, supra note 23, at 363. However, he also says that "a declaration of trust is nothing
but a statement that the settlor gives or has given the beneficiary [sic] interest in the
property to a specified donee," id. (emphasis added). Modem authorities such as
Scott, and older authorities such as Sir George Jessel, might well take issue with
Labatt's description of a declaration of trust, but it is one that many courts echo. The
problem of identifying or describing what a trust is will be examined more thoroughly
in Part IV, infra.
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by the corporation to A until her death. She apparently cashed
them or deposited them in her checking account.
Did A intend to make an inter vivos gift to B - an outright
transfer of the legal title as of two years ago - or did A intend
to retain the legal title and transfer to B the beneficial or equi-
table interest in the principal as a remainder, retaining for
herself an equitable life interest in the income? Had a lawyer
asked that question to A two years ago, no doubt A would have
stared in amazement, shook her head a few times, muttered
something under her breath about "these (unintelligible) law-
yers," and then have said something like, "They are his."
What A actually intended, regardless of what she said or
what the evidence says she said, was to make it possible for B
to enjoy the benefit of owning the stock after her death. She
felt she owed a moral debt and she wanted the peace of mind
of knowing that she had taken affirmative steps to effectuate
her desire. B's full enjoyment of the transfer was not intended
to take effect until A's death; from A's later actions we can
infer that she retained the interest in income from the stock.
What A "intended," as of two years ago, was neither a "gift"
nor a "trust," using those terms as legal abstractions. Her ac-
tual intent was more amorphorous, and for want of a better
term, we may say that A intended a "gratuitous transfer." One
very good reason why human behavior does not always fall
neatly into legal categories is that human beings do not always
think neatly in terms of legal abstractions.
If, in the above hypothetical, A had removed the stock
certificates from her safe deposit box and handed them to B,
declaring, "These are yours," she would clearly have intended
to convey all of her interest in them to B immediately. But that
was not what she wanted to do. If she had consulted a lawyer,
she might have been told that if she did not want to make a
will, the lawyer could draw up a document stating that she held
the stock in trust for B with a reserved interest in the income
for life and whatever other powers A might wish to reserve. If
A could afford to pay a lawyer for legal services and had fol-
lowed through with this action, she would have clearly in-
tended a declaration of trust, assuming the lawyer explained
to her what that was. For one reason or another, however, A did
not want to consult a lawyer. The lawyer's advice to execute a
formal declaration of trust would have been prompted by the
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recognition that the declaration of trust with certain reserved
powers and interests more nearly accorded with A's desires
than did a will, or for that matter, a completed inter vivos gift.
Thus the only thing standing between A's wishes and judicial
enforcement of A's designation of the recipient of her property
is a formal piece of paper drafted by a lawyer. There seems to
be no real difference between the underlying "intent" - per-
haps more appropriately "desire" - of A and of a person who
executes a formal document of trust. If a lawyer could have
recognized that before the fact, why cannot a court recognize
it after the fact?
Courts cannot, or at least do not, recognize this similarity
because A's actions and words were, from the standpoint of
legal abstractions, ambiguous - even if her intentions from a
non-legal standpoint were perfectly clear. The habit of deciding
cases on the basis of abstract conceptualizations is too well
entrenched to be forthrightly abandoned, but it is not neces-
sary to abandon this approach entirely to carry out A's intent.
All that need be abandoned, at least at this initial point in our
consideration of the declaration of the trust, is the assumption
that all ambiguous actions of this type are indicative of an
underlying intent to transfer both legal and equitable title, i.e.,
to make a "gift," perhaps a testamentary one.
The question of labeling a transaction as either a declara-
tion of trust or an attempted gift should be approached with a
more realistic attitude. It should be recognized that the layman
has as little appreciation of the legal abstraction that a "gift"
involves transfer of the legal and the equitable interest in the
property as he does of the abstraction that a trust involves the
separation of the legal and equitable interest. Once this mental
adjustment is made, courts will be more free to utilize the
declaration of trust construction without fear that they are
committing an intellectual sin which will result in the heaping
of scorn upon them by the profession and by treatise writers.49
11 Scott is critical of the use of the trust "as a sort of safety valve" to avoid settled
rules of law such as that of delivery for gifts. "It is the resort by the less intelligent
judges to artificialities like these which deservedly brings the law into disrepute."
Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. Rav. 1266, 1284 n.54 (1931).
He is not necessarily opposed to upholding transfers wherein delivery is faulty, but
seems to prefer a frontal assault on the delivery formality.as the means of doing so.
Id. Later, in his treatise, he is somewhat less commital about whether to attack the
delivery requirement. 1 Scorr § 31 at 249.
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The essential task of the judiciary can then shift to a more
meaningful level. Rather than viewing its role as that of a bulk-
head to prevent the pollution of legal doctrine, the judiciary
can get on with the task of making determinations focused
upon whether the transaction is one which the law ought to
uphold. If so, the court can properly supply the label which
upholds the transaction, if the label fits."0 It is appropriate,
then, to turn first to considerations of policy which underlie the
legal rules for gratuitous transfers. These considerations will
aid in the determination of whether an attempted transfer
ought to be upheld. Assuming a transaction which satisfies
these policies, Part IV will concern itself with fitting the decla-
ration of trust label on the transaction.
III. FORMALITIES AND THE TRUST
Contributing to the reluctance of courts to resort to the
declaration of trust construction for imperfect gifts is the per-
ception that the device is suspect because it lacks formalities.
Without formalities, there are no controls or limits on the ap-
plication of the device. The fear, as expressed by Master of the
Rolls Jessel in Richards, is that every imperfect gift will be
turned into a good declaration of trust. This result in turn
threatens to undermine the formality of delivery and, because
so many cases have a testamentary overtone, the Statute of
Wills.
This section will examine that concern, looking at the role
formalities play today in the law of gratuitous transfers and
testamentary dispositions, the relationship between the trust
and the formalities associated with testamentary transfers, and
the functions performed by the formalities.
A. Delivery and the Wills Statutes: Formalities Applied
The traditional method by which the legal system has
identified those gratuitous transactions which it will recognize
and enforce is the method of formalities. In the case of an inter
vivos gift, the most important formality is that of delivery; in
" "[The court should strive to effectuate intent by placing the case, if possible,
in a legal category imposing no doctrinal barriers." Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at
17.
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the case of testamentary dispositions, the formalities are those
identified with the statutes of wills.
1. Delivery
It was noted earlier5' that the requirement of delivery is, if
anything, even more strongly entrenched in modem cases than
it may have been formerly. There are occasional cases of fairly
recent vintage in which the absence of delivery in an informal
gift transaction is circumvented by finding a trust,52 but the
great majority of cases continue steadfastly to resist any use of
the declaration of trust as an alternative construction, indicat-
ing that the courts are not anxious to initiate overtly a process
which would weaken the formality of delivery as a doctrinal
requirement.53 Nevertheless, many decisions have applied the
doctrine of delivery in a way that does so.
When bent upon upholding the transaction, a determined
court can almost always find delivery if it wishes to. The con-
cepts of symbolic and constructive delivery and the trustee-
agent distinction - applied in cases where the subject of the
gift has been delivered to a third party55 - are wonderfully
malleable in the hands of an adept legal craftsman. They are
also vague enough to be blunt instruments used by not so adept
craftsmen to force facts to unexplained conclusions. 5 The net
result is a case law which "continue[s] to defy systematic
classification and analysis. ' 57 Not even Mechem's awesomely
comprehensive analysis of the case law and doctrine" could
bring any order or consistency to the actual decision-making
process.
This does not deny that many of the decisions are justifia-
ble in terms of their results. But it is one thing to say that the
11 See note 34 supra for the discussion on the delivery requirement in modem
cases.
11 Bingen v. First Trust Co., 103 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1939); Cooey v. Cooey, 182 So.
202 (Fla. 1938); Williams v. Bailey, 165 So. 439 (Miss. 1936); In re Horkan's Estate,
214 N.W. 438 (Wis. 1927).
" But see Scherer v. Hyland, 380 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1977).
u See generally Mechem, supra note 13, at 469-87.
See id. at 586-601.
See Rohan II, supra note 34; Stoijar, The Delivery of Chattels, 21 MOD. L. REv.
27 (1958).
" Rohan I, supra note 34, at 7. See also id. at 3-4; Ereli, supra note 13, at 224.
9 Mechem, supra note 13.
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result of a decision is justifiable and quite another to say that
the means of arriving at the decision is itself rational. Opposed
against those cases which stretch the doctrine almost beyond
recognition are numerous other cases which continue to apply
delivery rigidly regardless of the genuineness of the claim. The
schizophrenic case law, reflected in numerous split decisions,'
is unpredictable.10 The contours of the delivery requirement are
concomitantly impossible to describe. A formality it may be,
but it is one with little if any discernible form. These observa-
tions lead to the impression that the zeal behind the courts'
jealous protection of delivery through rigid application of the
Richards rule, albeit well-intentioned and even principled, is
perhaps misguided and wasted effort.
2. Will Formalities
To a lesser extent, the same symptoms are visible in the
application of the statutorily prescribed will formalities.
"Many of the formalities have produced a vast, contradictory,
unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case law in which the
courts purport to find literal compliance in cases which in fact
instance defective compliance.""1 This result may be particu-
larly true of a requirement like "presence" which has less finite
content than, for instance, the requirement of signing "at the
end." The other extreme is perhaps more common, as the
same observer seems to admit; 3 will formalities are imbued
with a sacredness rarely attributed to other statutory dictates."
51 See, e.g., Foster v. Reiss, 112 A.2d 553 (N.J. 1955); In re Cohn, 176 N.Y.S. 225
(App. Div. 1919).
N See Rohan I, supra note 34, at 2-3.
" Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HIv. L. Rav. 489,
525 (1975).
12 Even the requirement of signing at the "foot" or "end" has caused interpreta-
tion problems, however. See 2 BowE-PARKn: PAGE ON WniS § § 19.57-.68 (1960). As
for the "presence" requirement, see id. at § § 19.119-.128.
0 "When. . . a formal defect is manifest, the courts have denied themselves all
flexibility, no matter how sympathetic the frustrated legatees, and no matter how
remote and undeserving the intestate takers." Langbein, supra note 61, at 500-01.
" Mechem, supra note 13, at 350 n.23. "The statute concerning wills . . . is
unique, in the fact that it stands as one of the few legislative products of an early
generation which neither the reforming temper of advancing progress, nor the icono-
clastic hand of an all-pervading cacogthes for improvement, has seen proper to dis-
turb." In re Hale's Will, 121 A.2d 511, 518 (N.J. 1956) (quoting In re Sage's Estate,
107 A. 445, 445 (N.J. 1919)).
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It is therefore highly significant that the drafters of the
Uniform Probate Code of 1969 (UPC) set out deliberately to
minimize the formalities required for the valid execution of
wills. The UPC represents the first effort to reexamine compre-
hensively the premises and assumptions underlying the formal-
ities of will execution as embodied in the prototypical English
Statute of Frauds of 16775 and Wills Act of 1837.16 The preface
to the UPC's provisions on wills states, "The basic intent of
these sections is to validate the will whenever possible."67 To
this end, "[t]he formalities for execution of a witnessed will
have been reduced to a minimum"8 - not just reduced, but
reduced "to a minimum." The drafters therefore seem to have
made a conscious choice to eliminate those formalities that are
of dubious value.".
As one ponders the overall impact of the UPC, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that it has considerably diminished
the emphasis on formality that has been the hallmark of wills
law for centuries. The bare-bones formalities that remain for a
valid witnessed will are those that most laymen would asso-
ciate with a will: it must be in writing, it must be signed, and
there must be two witnesses. Gone are the arcane and less
familiar formalities such as publication and presence; gone also
are the more technical requirements which mandate a signa-
ture "at the end," or the witnessing of a particular aspect of
execution, such as the testator's signature. The simple,
straightforward, and demystified procedure of the UPC makes
it possible, if not probable, for a layman to preside at the exe-
" 29 Car. 2, c.3.
" 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c.26.
" U.P.C. Part 5, general comment.
0 U.P.C. § 2-502, comment.
0 For instance, the requirement that witnesses be "competent" or disinterested,
i.e., that they not be legatees or devisees under the will, and the requirement that the
testator be present when the witnesses sign the will were criticized by Gulliver and
Tilson because, if they serve the questionable protective function at all, their value
hardly seems to justify the harm done when wills are struck down by the innocent
failure to comply with them. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 10-13. The Uniform
Probate Code (U.P.C.) requires neither. U.P.C. § § 2-502, 2-505. See Langbein, supra
note 61, at 511. In addition, the U.P.C. does not require that the testator's signature
be at the end of the will, an evidentiary and protective measure against later fraudu-
lent additions to the will; nor does it require the testator to publish his will - announce
to the witnesses that the document is his will, which adds to the ceremonial aura and
reinforces the cautionary or ritual function. U.P.C. § 2-502 and comment. See Lang-
bein, supra note 61, at 511.
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cution of his own will without running grave risks of invalidity.
Surely the draftsmen must have realized and intended this
result. The broad sanctioning of holographic wills,7" usually
written without legal supervision, confirms the intent to de-
throne and demystify will formalities and bring the process of
disposing of property at death into the layman's world and
under his control.
B. The Role of the Trust in the Law of Gratuitous Transfers:
Formalities Avoided
At first blush, the Uniform Probate Code may appear to
be a startling alteration in the fabric of the law of wills. It is
not so startling, however, when one considers the proliferation
of will substitutes in this century. The will substitutes have
made it possible to dispose of property effectively at death with
only a minimum of legally imposed formalities. Thus, while the
UPC does make radical changes in the law governing wills per
se, the effect of the changes is to bring the law of making
testamentary dispositions by will more in harmony with that
of making essentially testamentary dispositions by will substi-
70 The spirit behind the U.P.C. is perhaps best exemplified by its liberal provision
for holographic wills. U.P.C. § 2-503. Holographic wills, which are handwritten by the
testator and unattested, have not been warmly received throughout the United States.
Holographic wills are recognized as valid in less than half the states. Langbein, supra
hIote 61, at 490 & n.3. Gulliver and Tilson attribute the reticence to grant them validity
to the fact that they sacrifice the protective and cautionary/ritual functions. Gulliver
& Tilson, supra note 1, at 13-14. Furthermore, since an informal letter can satisfy the
typical statute which requires only that the will be entirely handwritten by the testa-
tor, dated, and signed, holographic wills do not provide a reliable channel for the
expression of testamentary intent. Langbein, supra note 61, at 494. Because of these
problems, courts in several states have construed holographic will statutes very nar-
rowly. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 14 & n.42.
Disregarding the suspicion with which holographic wills have been viewed, and are
still viewed by some, see Chaffin, Execution, Revocation, and Revalidation of Wills:
A Critique of Existing Statutory Formalities, 11 GA. L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1977), the
U.P.C. boldly seeks to provide a legislative basis for their expanded operation. A will
form obtained from a stationery store, filled in by the testator in his own handwriting,
and signed, can be a valid will under the U.P.C. See U.P.C. § 2-503, comment. See
also A.L.I.-A.B.A., Tan UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANu 136 (1977). Further-
more, the U.P.C. abolishes the usual requirement that a holographic will be dated, a
requirement that, when applied strictly, has resulted in the judicial invalidation of
many holographic wills. E.g., Succession of Beird, 82 So. 881 (La. 1919), overruled in
Succession of Boyd, 306 So.2d 687 (La. 1975); Succession of Bendily, 132 So.2d 693
(La. Ct. App. 1961). See Langbein, supra note 61, at 512.
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tutes.7 ' The inter vivos trust device, two variants of which are
common will substitutes,72 has played a major role in changing
attitudes toward formalities associated with testamentary
transfers .
73
Certainly the most remarkable species of the trust genus
is the Totten or tentative trust. Requiring no more form than
that one make a savings deposit in a bank "in trust" for an-
other,7 the Totten trust allows the depositor or settlor to retain
complete and absolute control over the account until his death,
assured that the beneficiary will then enjoy whatever sum re-
mains in the account. For all practical purposes, the Totten
trust is a testamentary disposition, except for its dispensation
from will statute formalities.7 5 The beneficiary of this inter
vivos will substitute can hardly be distinguished from a legatee
or devisee named in a will.76 Scott concedes that "the trust is
a very thin trust and could easily be held to be testamentary.
'7
The Totten trust is generally held not to be a testamentary
disposition, however. This is not because courts and commen-
tators really believe that the device meets the doctrinal test for
71 The drafters of the U.P.C. hint obliquely that this effect was their design. "If
the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth
at death, its execution must be kept simple." U.P.C., Part 5, general comment. See
Langbein's reaction to this comment in Langbein, supra note 61, at 510 n.87.
n Other will substitutes are life insurance, annuity contracts, joint and survivor
bank accounts, and joint tenancy ownership of land. Langbein, supra note 61, at 503-
09; Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and
Society, 1966 Wim. L. Rzv. 340, 368.
" The trust can also be viewed as a gift substitute: It enables an owner to make
an inter vivos transfer that is revocable, and, in the case of a declaration of trust,
without delivery. This result is impossible to achieve with an outright gift. See
RESTATEM4T § 37, comment a. Oddly, this fact has had no impact on the formality of
delivery in the law of gifts.
7' Estes, In Search of a Less Tentative Totten, 5 PEppennxm L. Rnv. 21, 22 & n.2
(1977).
" Friedman, supra note 72, at 369; Langbein, supra note 58, at 506. The Totten
trust is subject to the federal estate tax. 1 ScoTr § 58.3, at 535 and case cited in n.27.
It may be subject to the forced share of a surviving spouse of the depositor. 1 ScoTr §
58.5, at 547; RESTATEMzNT § 58, comment e; Montgomery v. Michaels, 301 N.E.2d 465
(IM. 1973). Creditors of an insolvent estate take precedence over the named beneficiary.
1 ScOTr § 58.5, at 543-44. The death of the beneficiary before the settlor terminates
the trust automatically, or to use the wills analogy, causes the intended gift to lapse.
1 Saomr § 58.4, at 536-37; RESTATEmmT § 58, comment c.
" "Like a will, [the Totten trust] names a beneficiary, but gives him no solid
legal interest unless the testator dies without changing his mind." Friedman, supra
note 72, at 369.
" 1 Sco~r § 58.3, at 527.
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an inter vivos transfer, i.e., that the beneficiary receives -an
interest prior to the settlor's death,78 but because of the com-
mon perception that "there seems to be no sufficiently strong
policy to invalidate these trusts."" The Totten trust, as Fried-
man states, is "volitional, formal, and solidly backed by busi-
ness practice."'' In short, it "fulfills the purposes of the Wills
Act.""'
If the Totten trust is the "poor man's will" or perhaps
more accurately the "middle-class will, '"2 the full blown,
lawyer-drafted "living trust" is the rich man's will. Here, how-
ever, the characteristics which give the device a testamentary
flavor are deliberately drafted into an elaborate instrument
rather than being grafted by courts onto a simple and routine
transaction as is the case with Totten trusts.8 3 The settlor may,
and often does, specifically reserve the right to receive income
from the property during his life and the power to revoke, alter,
or amend the trust in any way, including a change in benefici-
aries. He can and normally-would provide for the termination
of a beneficiary's interest in the event of the beneficiary's death
before the settlor. "The settlor characteristically retains noth-
ing short of absolute ownership."'
Courts have also been willing to sustain formal 5 living
1 Scorr § 58.4A; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 37; Note, Savings Account
Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 Noma Di m LAw. 686 (1974).
7' 1 Scorr § 58.3, at 527.
U Friedman, supra note 72, at 369.
" Langbein, supra note 61, at 507 (paraphrasing 1 Sco'rr § 58.3, at 526).
U Friedman, supra note 72, at 369.
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 37-38.
U Langbein, supra note 61, at 505.06.
" "Formal" is used here to denote a trust created under circumstances bespeaking
ceremony. It does not denote compliance with any externally imposed legal formalities,
for there are none when a living trust of personalty is created by declaration. Of course,
when a trust is created by a transfer of the trust assets to a trustee, the delivery
formality must be performed. Cf. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 144 N.E.
686 (N.Y. 1924) (attempted transfer of stock in trust held invalid as to portion of stock
not delivered to the trustee). Fulfillment of the delivery requirement through a transfer
in trust may have played a part in the early cases in sustaining the living trust when
that device was used as a testamentary substitute. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note
1, at 23-24 and authorities cited in n.85. The living trust doctrine is certainly not
limited to transfers in trust now, however; they are equally valid when the owner
declares himself trustee.
The level of formality that is assumed to exist in the creation of a living trust
seems to have been downgraded over the years. For example, Gulliver and Tilson
thought that "such transactions [transfers in trust] are usually supervised by attor-
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trusts against objections that they are testamentary, although,
unlike Totten trusts,"6 they are likely to involve substantial
amounts of money. The greater level of formality that might
be called for under these circumstances is apparently provided
by the assumed participation of lawyers or other counselors87
and the usual practice of signing instruments of trust creation.
Although the real reason for sustaining the living trusts is the
perception that their creation usually comports with the func-
tions of will formalities," courts persist in approaching the
neys, [and] it is probable that a formal instrument will be prepared and delivered
even though it is not doctrinally essential to do so in the case of personal property."
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 24. Some years later Langbein observed, "In prac-
tice the declaration of trust is inevitably in writing and signed by the settlor. It is
usually in standardized unambiguous language, whether specifically drafted by a law-
yer or obtained by the settlor from a form book, bank, investment company or wher-
ever." Langbein, supra note 61, at 507 (emphasis added). It is a little bothersome that
Langbein's description apparently comprehends (perhaps unintentionally) the so-
called "Dacey Trusts," forms for which were sensationally marketed by Norman F.
Dacey in his book, How To Avom PROBATE (1965). While the use of a standardized form
might be sufficiently "formal" when used by a person who is aware of the form's
significance, the Dacey Trusts were touted in advertisements which emphasized the
"astonishingly simple way" purchasers of the book could prevent having their money
"siphoned off by a scandalous probate system before it ever reaches their loved ones."
Local newspaper advertisement, quoted in J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY
WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLs, TRusTs, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING 65
(1972). The same advertisement promises, "With each instrument are instructions
that even a school child can understand, and a picture of how the instrument should
look when it is completed. All of the instruments are specially perforated for easy
removal from the book and actual use." Id. at 66 (emphasis in original).
Without gainsaying the legitimate frustration with the probate system upon which
this best-selling book capitalized, the manner of marketing the Dacey Trust seems
likely to have the effect of undercutting some of those elements which justify the
revocable living trust as a will substitute, especially the satisfaction of the caution-
ary/ritual function designed to assure deliberation and solemnity. Dacey's book has
been critiqued in a number of book reviews. See, e.g., Gibson & McFarlain, Book
Review, 41 FLA. B.J. 26 (1967); Henderson, Book Review, 46 B.U.L. REv. 417 (1966);
Weaver, Book Review, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 853 (1966-1967); Wren, Book Review,
42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 445 (1966-1967).
" "In view, however, of the convenience of this method [Totten Trusts] of dispos-
ing of comparatively small sums of money without the necessity of resorting to probate
proceedings, there seems to be no sufficiently strong policy to invalidate these trusts."
1 Scor § 58.3, at 527.
" This assumption is not necessarily true in all cases. See note 85, supra.
The perception that a degree of ceremonial formality often underlies the crea-
tion of living trusts was sufficiently entrenched to lead to a change in § 57 of the first
Restateinent of Trusts. The first Restatement provided that the retention of "such
power to control the trustee as to the details of the administration of the trust that
the trustee is the agent of the settlor" made the trust testamentary insofar as it was
intended to take effect after the death of the settlor, and therefore required compliance
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question analytically from the standpoint of whether the bene-
ficiary received an interest prior to the settlor's death. With a
perfectly straight face, courts have concluded that the benefici-
ary had received "something" at the moment of the trust's
creation, even though the settlor retained the income interest
for his life and the power to change the beneficiary, revoke the
trust, and sell the trust property, thereby revoking the trust.89
In the case of both the Totten trust and the formal revoca-
ble trust, courts have sanctioned the utilization of a device to
achieve the results of a will without compliance with the legal
formalities for wills. They perceive, and correctly so, that the
absence of formalities should not automatically result in the
invalidity of the transferor's expressed desires. Perhaps they
also sympathize with the reason that often underlies the trans-
feror's choice of a means of disposition other than the will: the
avoidance of the delay and expense of probate or administra-
tion.
In reaching this end, the courts have taken liberties with
doctrinal niceties of trust law. Calling the Totten device a
"trust" in the technical sense of the term is, to put it bluntly,
a prevarication. By the same token, most authorities have
been reluctant to endorse the abstract reasoning which finds an
interest passing to the beneficiary of a revocable living trust
prior to the settlor's death.9 Nevertheless, the place of these
with will formalities. RESTATEMENT OF TRusTs § 57(2) (1935). The Restatement, Sec-
ond, modified this section to provide that the reservation of powers, including "a power
to control the trustee as to the administration of the trust" does not in and of itself
make the trust testamentary, so long as "an interest in the trust property is created
in a beneficiary other than the settlor." RErATEM ET § 57. Scott explains the revision:
A formal trust instrument is very different from an instruction given orally
or in a letter. If a trust is formally created, the danger of false claims is no
greater because of the reservation of powers of control over the trustee re-
served by the settlor, than it would be if no such power had been retained.
1 Scorr § 57.2, at 485.
The net effect of the 1957 revision of § 57 is to expand the operation of living trusts
as will substitutes by making more of them valid without compliance with will formali-
ties. Under the revised language of § 57, the courts have ample leeway to apply the
inherently flexible "interest" criterion, see note 45, supra and accompanying text,
without being tied to a specified level of formality or mechanical definition of what
makes a trust "formal."
Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955).
N See Note, supra note 78, at 692-93; Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DiCK.
L. REV. 37, 38 (1934).
" See Langbein, supra note 61, at 505 n.69; Friedman, supra note 72, at 369 n.80;
Estes, supra note 74 at 33 n.48.
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two devices as will substitutes seems secure, as does the fact
that they will continue to be dealt with under the ample um-
brella of trust law.
Nor should this surprise. The manner in which courts have
shown themselves willing to mold the trust like putty to fill
crevices, and even crevasses, in the law is neither new nor
extraordinary. The origin of the trust and the nature of its
development in equity is the story of a device that has always
been anomalous vis-a-vis comparable legal rules. Its direct
ancestor, the use,92 was widely employed by feudal land owners
to avoid cumbersome burdens of land ownership and other
unpopular or unnecessarily technical rules of the common law
courts.' 3 In the exercise of his jurisdiction over the use, and,
after the Statute of Uses, the trust, the chancellor ignored those
common law rules which were outmoded relics of the feudal
system.94 The immediate result was a contrasting dual system
of law and equity.5 The long range product of the trust's evolu-
32 The origins of the use are obscure. Originally, it was thought that the idea of
the use was derived from the Roman law fideicommissum, see 2 J. STORY, CorwamurrAR-
JES ON EQurry JURISPRUDENCE 649-50 (14th ed. 1918), or its usus or usufructus. However,
current thought accepts Holmes' view that the Germanic Salman or Treuhand is a
closer analogy to the use which evolved in England. 4 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 410-12 (1924). The "root idea" of the use is "the recognition of the duty
of a person to whom property has been conveyed for certain purposes to carry out those
purposes." Id. at 410. The first wide scale utilization of the use in England probably
commenced in the thirteenth century to hold land and housing as habitation for the
Franciscan friars, who could not "own" property under their vows of poverty. 2 F.
POLLocK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 13, at 231. However, it was not sufficiently com-
mon or defined to merit a "comfortable niche" in the common law's system of original
writs. Id. at 232. The inability of the common law courts to provide a remedy when
the use or confidence was breached forced petitioners to go to the King's Chancellor,
who gradually assumed a jurisdiction which was "well established" by the early fif-
teenth century. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra at 418-20. " 'The use' seems to be accomplish-
ing its manifest destiny when at length after many adventures it appears as 'equitable
ownership.' " 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, supra at 232.
Among the perceived benefits of holding land to uses were the avoidance of
feudal dues, the equivalent of modern day estate taxes; the ability to designate a
successor in ownership to land at death prior to its becoming devisable in 1540, see
note 119, infra; the evasion of mortmain statutes forbidding monasteries to own land;
and the creation of springing and shifting executory interests in land which the com-
mon law courts refused to recognize as legal estates prior to the Statute of Uses in 1536.
See 4 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 420-21 (1924); T. PLUCKNEr, supra
note 10, at 582; C. ST. GEIRMAiN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, Dialogue 2, c.22 at 223-24 (91
Selden Society 1974); 1 ScoTt § § 1.3-.5.
2 ScoTT § 130, at 1050.
See T. PLUCKNrPT, supra note 10, at 675-84. But see F. MAITLAND, Equrry 1-22
(2d ed. 1936).
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tion in equity was not a cramped, mechanical, and formalistic
device; in fact, as Maitland so grandly declares, it is not a
device at all, but "an 'institute' of great elasticity and general-
ity."" More often than not, its elasticity and generality have
allowed the trust to be seized upon as the means of achieving
a desirable result which was difficult, if not impossible, under
more traditional and narrowly defined"7 property concepts."
In light of the origin and evolution of the trust, and the
way it has been used consistently to provide relief from the
pinch of rigid legal rules, the only thing that is truly anomalous
about the informal declaration of trust is that it has shriveled
into a nonconcept from desuetude. If the informal, admittedly
anomalous Totten trust" and the formal revocable declaration
of trust can be used to transfer property at death without com-
pliance with will formalities, it seems neither an exploitation
nor a contortion of the trust device to rely on it in cases of
attempted inter vivos dispositions where the functions of for-
malities have been performed and only delivery is absent.
"F. MAITLAND, EQUrry 23 (2d ed. 1936).
" Some would say ossified. See W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAw INDicran! (1967).
For example, the trust concept was seized upon by some courts to sustain
survivorship bank accounts. See, e.g., Booth v. Oakland Bank and Say., 54 P. 370 (Cal.
1898); Carr v. Carr, 115 P. 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911). English courts have used trusts
to evade contract rules which did not recognize third-party beneficiaries. 1 ScoTr § 87,
at 728. See Ereli, supra note 13, at 190-91. See generally Arnold, supra note 8. In the
realm of speculation, it seems plausible that one reason for the relatively easy develop-
ment of the tentative trust doctrine, in comparison with joint banking accounts, was
the ability to treat it as a trust concept because the form of deposit fortuitously used
the word "trust." For an overview of the morass of the law surrounding joint bank
accounts, see Boyce, Joint Bank Accounts with Right of Survivorship: A Conceptual
Maze, 6 CAP. U. L. Rv. 477 (1977); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank
Account Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 376 (1959). Of course, the tentative trust doctrine
is not without its problems and critics. See Estes, supra note 74; Larramore, Judicial
Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L. J. 312 (1905); Note, supra note 78. Nor are
tentative trusts recognized as a valid will substitute in every jurisdiction. Estes counts
eighteen states that recognize the Totten trust in some form or another as a common
law concept, plus New York and New Jersey which recognize it by statute. Estes,
supra, at 26 nn.21 & 22.
" Comment, Matter of Totten - An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DE PAUL
L. REV. 117 (1956).
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C. The Formalities and Their Functions
1. The Functional Analysis' °
The role that formalities play in the law is increasingly
being viewed from the standpoint of the functions they per-
form. Considering the elasticity of the delivery formality, the
de-emphasis on will formalities, and the fluidity with which the
trust device is used to avoid will formalities, the function per-
formed by each formality should be viewed as an underlying
"constant" by which to measure the value of the formality
itself. Once these functions have been isolated, both the func-
tions and formalities can be evaluated from a policy stand-
point. To what extent are the functions legitimate ones which
the legal system should insist upon being satisfied? To what
extent do the formalities perform the function? Once these
inquiries are made, the transactions themselves can be ap-
proached from the functional standpoint; if the functions have
been substantially performed, "an intended transfer should be
sustained."'1'
11 trhe following discussion draws heavily from Mechem, supra note 13; Gulliver
& Tilson, supra note 1; and Langbein, supra note 61. While footnote citations to these
works will be made throughout the discussion, it is appropriate to acknowledge here
in a more general way the substantial debt owed to the scholarship of these individuals.
MI Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 17. In the analysis of Gulliver and Tilson,
the mechanical device for sustaining transactions is that of classification. The analyti-
cal approach given here is largely identical to theirs. Langbein has extended the utility
of the functional analysis to a large number of cases which are not reached by Gulliver
and Tilson: those in which classification is obvious. He argues that testamentary
dispositions (wills) which are defective in their literal compliance with the rigid formal-
ities of the wills acts should nevertheless be upheld if the functions served by those
formalities have been substantially satisfied. While Gulliver and Tilson advocate plac-
ing a transfer in a category which imposes no doctrinal barriers to the validity of that
specific transaction, Langbein argues that the doctrinal barriers (formalities) them-
selves should be dispensed with, though only partially, in individual cases where it is
appropriate to do so. The declaration of trust is a device that is formality-free in its
creation; it therefore imposes none of the specific doctrinal barriers which were ad-
dressed by Gulliver and Tilson and by Langbein. When Gulliver and Tilson's analytic
approach is applied to a case where the choice is between a declaration of trust and
an attempted gift, the result of classification is either a category which imposes a
formality (delivery) or one that does not. Thus the effect of using Gulliver and Tilson's
more conservative analytic approach may be to dispense with formalities in that case,
an effect which they seem to have been reluctant to endorse. See Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 1, at 16-17 & nn.61 & 62. Langbein's use of the functional analysis as a
justification for a substantial compliance doctrine in wills law is therefore important
adjunctive support for the analytical approach advocated here. It deals directly, rather
than indirectly, with the necessity for compliance with the formalities themselves.
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What then are the functions which underlie the formalities
required for gratuitous transfers? The formalities of both deliv-
ery and the statutes of wills must be examined even though the
choice of classification under consideration is, theoretically,
between a gift and a declaration of trust. The transactions very
frequently have a testamentary flavor and courts have often
indicated a strong aversion to undermining not only the deliv-
ery requirement but also the statute of wills through the decla-
ration of trust construction.
a. The Evidentiary Function
Formalities may serve an evidentiary function by provid-
ing reliable evidence of the fact and the terms of the alleged
action or transaction.102 Delivery places in the physical posses-
sion of the donee the object of the gift or a writing which is
intended to represent it. The act itself is fairly unequivocal to
any witnesses who may be present, and it gives the donee some-
thing which is difficult to fabricate.103 The possession of the
object or a written instrument is also evidence of the terms of
the transaction because possession of either would reliably
identify the property which was the subject of the transaction.
However, delivery is not totally reliable as an indicator of the
type of transaction the transferor intended, since giving some-
one else possession of property is consistent with various in-
tents. It does, however, corroborate that an outright gift was
intended. 0' Almost all of the will formalities serve, to a greater
or lesser extent, the purpose of providing reliable evidence that
the instrument was intended to be a will and what its terms
are.
0 5
b. The Cautionary or Ritual Function"°'
Formalities which caution the transferor of the signifi-
1 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 4; Langbein, supra note 61, at 492-93.
m Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 16; Mechem, supra note 13, at 349.
" Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 16.
14 Id. at 6-8. A written instrument, signature, and witnesses to attest the execu-
tion, together with other common but less universal formalities such as placing the
signature at the end and publication, all serve to assure that a court will have satisfac-
tory evidence that a document was executed, that it ivas intended to be a will, and
what its terms are. Langbein, supra note 61 at 492-93.
I" Gulliver and Tilson coined the phrase "ritual function." Langbein prefers Pro-
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cance and finality of his act are desirable since they force upon
him the opportunity to reflect on its significance; they also
indicate to the court that the action was taken with delibera-
tion.1 1 By limiting judicial recognition to transfers which com-
ply with such formalities, the courts reduce the chance of giv-
ing legal import to words carelessly spoken or to idle rumina-
tions about actions to be taken in the future.
The act of delivery requires the transferor to part physi-
cally with something. The "wrench of delivery""' which the
donor suffers in completing a gift emphasizes the import of the
act. It makes "vivid and concrete" the significance of the act
and tends to assure at least a moment's reflection by the
donor. 101
In the case of transfers at death by will, the cautionary
function is served primarily by the requirements of a writing
and a signature. It is also aided by the ceremonial aura lent to
the occasion by the attesting formalities. 10
c. The Channeling Function
Professor Fuller identified a channeling function of legal
form in his discussion of contract law."' Requirements of form,
he observed, offer "channels for the legally effective expression
of intention."" 2 Human behavior which utilizes the proper
legal form for achieving a desired end is "channeled behavior."
The desirability of encouraging behavior thus channeled has
two aspects. It signals to those who administer the law that a
legally effective transaction was intended and what sort of legal
transaction was intended. More important to Fuller was the
advantage of channeled behavior "for those transacting busi-
ness out of court.""' Form is a means of communicating to
other participants the legal significance which one wants a
transaction to have. It is just as important to have generally
fessor Fuller's expression of the same idea in terms of a "cautionary" function. See
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. Rav. 799, 800 (1941); Langbein, supra
note 61, at 495 n.30.
" Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 3-4; Langbein, supra note 61, at 495.
Mechem, supra note 13, at 348.
' Id.
"' Langbein, supra note 61, at 495.
Fuller, supra note 106, at 801-03.
22 Id. at 801.
113 Id.
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accepted forms for this expression as it is to have a common
language for communicating thoughts.
Delivery of gifts makes the task of judicial enforcement
easier. Ideally, it alleviates altogether the necessity for a judi-
cial proceeding to implement the transaction,"4 unlike a testa-
mentary gift by will which necessarily contemplates judicial
implementation. The number of gift cases in the reporters,
however, indicates that the delivery requirement does not al-
ways keep these transactions from being litigated. When they
are litigated, the channel of delivery does theoretically make
the judicial task easier by clearly and simply signaling the
donor's intended finality to the transaction.
The channel of delivery also facilitates understanding of
the transaction by those who participate in it - the donor and
donee. At least in the ordinary case,"' the donee is unlikely to
understand or believe that the donor really intended an out-
right gift unless he follows through with the act of delivery."'
The advantage of channeling the act of testation into the
formalities of the wills act is limited largely to the ease of
judicial administration which is thereby made possible. Since
wills by their very nature contemplate judicial administration,
the volume of cases that probate courts must handle requires
as much standardization in form as possible.1
"I Ereli, supra note 13, at 223. Cf. Labatt, supra note 23, at 363 (the donee may
have to appear in court, but only to obtain a judicial declaration that he already has
the interest he claims).
"I Mechem describes an "ordinary" case as one "where the chattel is present, is
readily susceptible of manual tradition, and no circumstances exist making it neces-
sary or desirable for the donor to retain possession after the gift." Mechem, supra note
13, at 353.
" If A has in his possession a chattel which is susceptible of ready
manual tradition, and he desires to make an unconditional gift of that chat-
tel to B, who is present and willing to accept it, A will normally express his
donative intent in some form or other, and hand over the chattel. Conceiva-
bly, even, he may hand it to B without any other expression of donative
intent. The need of such an act, i.e., the tradition, is instinctively felt by both
parties. A pulls his watch from his pocket, says to B: 'I hereby give you this
watch' . . . and then returns the watch to his pocket. Is that transaction
normal? The instincts of both parties will lead to a feeling that the transac-
tion is not quite normal, not quite what it seems to be. Neither party, we
will assume, has any idea of the legal principles involved, but neither's sense
of incompleteness is any the less for that. A may say to himself: 'If I gave it
to him, why did I put it back in my pocket?' B may say to himself: 'I guess
he was joking, since he didn't in fact give it to me.'
Mechem, supra note 13, at 346-47 (emphasis in the original; footnote omitted).
"I Friedman, supra note 72, at 368. There are some benefits to the testator and
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d. The Protective Function
Gulliver and Tilson identified some formalities of wills
statutes as serving the purpose of safeguarding the testator at
the time of execution.18 In the early years after the first enact-
ment of a Wills Act"t 9 in England, there may have been a justi-
fiable concern that testators were old, weak, and susceptible
victims for greedy and unscrupulous persons.' However, this
is probably not an accurate stereotype of the testator today.'
The legitimacy of the protective function, questioned by Gul-
liver and Tilson,12 is not universally accepted."'
It is difficult to discern a protective function in the require-
ment of delivery.'24 Witnesses need not be present during deliv-
ery; therefore, obtaining possession by force or fraud exerted by
an alleged "donee" is at least a possibility. Because of this, a
"gift," like an unwitnessed holographic will, is "obtainable by
compulsion as easily as a ransom note."'' 25 However, there is no
compelling need for a protective function in the formalities for
making gifts; an owner whose property has been wrested from
him by force or trickery has legal remedies available to him.26
In view of the fact that no protective functions are identi-
fied with the delivery requirement, it may seem somewhat cu-
rious that courts persist in expressing a fear of fraud in gift
transactions and view delivery as a protection against it.127 The
the devisees in the channeling of testamentary behavior. "[The testator] does not
have to devise for himself a mode of communicating his testamentary wishes to the
court, and to worry whether it will be effective . . . The lowered costs of routinized
judicial administration benefit the estate and ultimate its distributees." Langbein,
supra note 61, at 494.
' Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 4-5, 9-13.
"' The first imposition of stringent formalities for will execution came with the
English Statute of Frauds in 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. The earlier Statute of Wills, 32 Henry
8, c. 1 (1540), marked the first time that some lands were devisable at common law
and required only that a will of real property be written. T. PLUCKNErr, supra note 10,
at 587, 740.
110 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 10.
1i Id.
'2 Id. at 9-13.
'2 See U.P.C. § 2-505, comment.
"I See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 9, 20.
'" Id. at 14.
1Z, Of course, the testator who has been imposed upon has an even "simpler and
more uniformly prevalent means of nullifying the effect of imposition" in that he can
simply revoke his will without recourse to the courts. Id. at 9.
I" See Labatt, supra note 23, at 365; Mechem, supra note 13, at 349-50; Rohan I,
supra note 34, at 12-13 & nn.26, 27.
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perception is not totally without foundation, however, since the
fear is not so much of fraud exerted at the time of the making
of the gift but rather of a fraudulent claim asserted after the
alleged gift, particularly after the owner's death. As Mechem
observed, "[it is easier to fabricate a story than to abstract
the property." 12s If one gains possession of property while the
owner is still alive, without subsequent protests, explanations,
or attempts to regain possession by the owner, it may be justifi-
ably presumed that possession was gained rightfully; delivery
indicates the absence of fraud.19 It would seem, therefore, that
delivery is related to the prevention of fraud solely because of-
its evidentiary function in detecting fraudulent claims asserted
after the alleged transaction, or in detecting the absence of
fraud of such a claim, and not because it actually prevents
fraudulent transfers.
The functional analysis provides a basis for viewing for-
malities as succinct distillations of policy judgments about the
sorts of transactions which should be upheld. Viewed as such,
there are valid reasons to retain formalities in the legal super-
structure and to apply them, temperately, even when to do so
results in the thwarting of an intended gratuitous transfer. On
the other hand, because there is a fundamental principle that
the owner's intent will be effectuated whenever possible, 10 for-
12 Mechem, supra note 13, at 349.
' See Ratcliff v. Lee, 192 P.2d 843, 845 (Okla. 1948); Rohan I, supra note 34, at
14 n.26.
"' See note 1 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this underlying prin-
ciple. See also Friedman, supra note 72, at 355; Rohan I, supra note 34, at 3. Of course,
there always have been and always will be countervailing policies which call for the
imposition of some limits on an owner's freedom of disposition. The unique importance
of succession to land in the feudal system led to the banning of wills of land in England
prior to 1540. See T. PLuCKNErr, supra note 10, at 521-87. The Rule against Perpetui-
ties evolved from a long-standing policy against the prolonged tying-up of property or
"dead hand control." See generally L. SIMas, PUBuC POUCY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955);
Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEAr, TAXas AND F Amy PROPERTY
119 (1977). But see Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on
the Origins of the Rule against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 19 (1977). The peculiar
institutions of dower and curtesy protected a surviving spouse from pauperism. Mod-
em times have seen a shift in policy emphasis from "protecting" the spouse to recog-
nizing the contribution a spouse makes to the accumulation of wealth and assuring
that a fair share of that wealth reaches the surviving spouse, regardless of the owner's
desires. See Haskell, Restraints upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in
DATH, TAXEs AND FAmIY PROPERTY 105, 111 (1977); Kulzer, Law and the Housewife:
Property, Divorce and Death, 28 FLA. L. REv. 1,30-37 (1975); U.P.C. §§ 2-201 to 2-207
and general comment, Part 2. But see Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A
Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. Ray. 681 (1966).
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malities should not be placed on a pedestal as ends in them-
selves.
The absence of doctrinally propounded formalities for the
creation of a declaration of trust of personalty does not neces-
sarily mean that they are a grave threat to the rule of law or
an invitation to courts to make unguided decisions about the
validity of attempted transfers. We will now further examine
how the declaration of trust device might satisfy the policy
goals of formalities.
2. The Informal Declaration of Trust: The Functions
Considered
It was earlier noted that Totten trusts and revocable living
trusts have been sustained as will substitutes even though they
allow avoidance of will formalities. The willingness of courts to
sanction this avoidance is accounted for by the perception that
when these two devices are employed, the functions of will
formalities are performed in other ways besides compliance
with the wills acts. There is a salient distinction between the
trusts recognized as will substitutes and the proposed use of
informal declarations of trust in attempted gift cases. In the
case of Totten trusts and revocable living trusts, the courts are
applying the trust doctrine against a backdrop of routinized,
customary procedures. The assumption that the evidentiary
and cautionary/ritual functions of legal formalities are fulfilled
is based on familiar practices of banks or other commercial
institutions,' 1 or the counseling of clients by the legal profes-
sion.' 2 The channeling function is satisfied by the institutional
routine. Giving play to a broader use of the informal and unin-
tended, as it were, delcaration of trust, however, cannot be
justifed on the basis that the law is merely catching up with
human behavior that has become routine and customary.' 3
Mechem and others were undoubtedly correct in their observa-
tion that declarations of trust are insignificant in the gift giving
'' Friedman, supra note 72, at 368-70; Langbein, supra note 61, at 507; see also
Fuller, supra note 106, at 806.
,3' Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 24.
,= Of the Totten trust doctrine, one court said, "[Ilts enunciation is but another
evidence of the attempt of the courts to conform the law to the customs of the com-
munity." In re Reich's Estate, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
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habits of the lay population; '34 they are certainly not used on a
conscious level.
The question that must be answered is whether an ad hoc,
case-by-case recognition that policy considerations behind for-
malities have been met entails dangers that do not exist when
the transactions are channeled through widely known and un-
derstood practices. The answer must be dealt with on several
levels.
In the first place, an ad hoc determination that the trans-
action should be upheld because the evidentiary and caution-
ary functions have been satisfied certainly seems to be as fac-
tually valid as one based on presumptions about how people
and institutions conduct their affairs. If enough facts are mar-
shalled by the litigants, a court or jury should be able to come
to conclusions about whether the transferor acted deliberately,
volitionally, and with appreciation of, the significance of his
acts, and whether the transferee's claim is genuine, not based
on fabricated allegations.'1 If anything, such a showing should
be stronger than the assumptions relied on. It does not stretch
the imagination to conjure up a confused bank depositor filling
out a form for a savings deposit "in trust" for another, waited
on by a teller who little knows or cares that the customer has
created a significant and solemn will substitute unless someone
can prove a contrary intent after the depositor is dead.' 3 In a
similar vein, it is not altogether incredible, even if it is difficult
to admit, that a client might map out his desires to a lawyer
who later unceremoniously produces a form from his files and
casually requests a signature on the dotted line. Similarly, in-
vestment company representatives may well gloss over the seri-
ousness of a scheme in an effort to obtain a signature on a
revocable trust form to complete a sale. Nevertheless, the oper-
ative assumption remains an ideal one, that all will substitutes
"are formal, rather solemn legal acts, which require some
" See notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
"= A ready example of a case in which the facts provided abundant evidence from
which to conclude that the evidentiary and cautionary functions were satisfied is the
Nye case discussed in the introduction. For a discussion of those facts, see text accom-
panying notes 175-78 infra. See also note 223 infra for a discussion of another case in
which the functions were satisfied.
Mechem thought such questions were "quite comprehensible to the lay mind."
Mechem, supra note 13, at 354.
"' See Sadofski v. Williams, 290 A.2d 143, 151 (N.J. 1972).
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thought if not the help of the lawyer."137
If an objection can be raised to the kind of ad hoc adjudica-
tion that would be required for a broader application of the
informal declaration of trust, it would seem to be that such an
application presents the possibility of unlimited litigation re-
quiring difficult and therefore time-consuming factual deter-
minations. Certainly, the factual issues are not easy to resolve.
In effect, this objection is that the benefits to the judicial sys-
tem attributed to the channeling function of delivery will be
lost.
That an unmanageable or unwarranted increase in litiga-
tion will result seems unlikely. The shapeless boundaries of the
delivery doctrine already invite a surprising amount of litiga-
tion.'1 The persistent refusal of courts to fall back on the decla-
ration of trust construction has not seemed to discourage liti-
gants from attempting to establish gifts even in cases where
delivery is obviously wanting. Then, too, it must be remem-
bered that the disputes in question, those over the disposition
of property of a deceased person, are likely to involve a high
degree of emotional involvement. From the standpoint of the
would-be donee, the property may be a remembrance of a dear
friend, beloved family member, or kind employer. The symbol-
ism of the property as a tangible reminder of the relationship
terminated by death may be far more important than its eco-
nomic value and may provide an impetus to pursue the claim
in the courts that seems unwarranted by the value of the prop-
erty or the strength of the legal argument.
Another aspect of the channeling function - its impact on
extrajudicial human behavior - must also be considered.
Would the overt judicial recognition that declarations of trust
may substitute for delivery encourage ambiguous behavior that
would clog channels of communication?'39
Assuming that state court decisions have an impact on
individual behavior,"'4 it is improbable that the approach urged
'P Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEAT, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY 15 (1977).
"' Rohan I, supra note 34, at 9-10. See Mechem, supra note 13, at 341 n.5.
' ' This is the second aspect of the channeling function of form which Fuller
identified. See note 113, supra, and accompanying text.
"I, Friedman has observed, "[SItate courts in particular no longer are or can
imagine themselves to be a major force in building up and maintaining legal doctrine."
Friedman, supra note 72, at 373. Under this view of the efficacy of state court decisions,
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would have any impact on the realm of behavior from which
these kinds of cases arise. The attempted gift cases reveal that
most people simply do not consult a lawyer for advice about
how to carry out their gift-making desires."' They are certainly
not aware of the legal nuances of delivery; indeed, they proba-
bly give little thought at all to the legal ramifications of their
actions. This is unlikely to change. Nor, it might be added,
should it change in view of the already burdensome cost, espe-
cially for the middle class, of obtaining adequate legal services.
In light of this, it is fanciful to assume that increased judicial
utilization of the declaration of trust, an abstract legal doc-
trine, will sift out of the pages of the legal reports and meta-
morphose behavior at this level.14 Behavior that does not fit
neatly into the legal channel of delivery is already occurring,
and will not be increased. For the same reasons, it is improba-
ble that recognition of the declaration of trust in informal situ-
ations will cause any more behavior to be consciously chan-
neled into expressed "trust" behavior: most people will con-
tinue to transfer property based upon motives other than a
conscious desire to fit into the "letter of the law." Broader
implementation of the declaration of trust will simply give
courts an alternative means of dealing with ambiguous behav-
ior when it cannot be fit into the delivery mold.
It should also be observed that Fuller's concern for the
communication aspect of the channeling function occurred in
the context of contract law which presupposes two or more
people bargaining for promises or performance from each other.
Likewise, the outright gift situation inherently entails commu-
nication between the donor and the donee or a third party who
receives the property in the donee's behalf. Since these two
legal transactions inevitably require the participation of more
than one party, it is useful to have a form for the expression of
intention. In contrast, the declaration of trust need not be com-
the impact of court decisions in individual cases is probably not of major importance
in channeling behavior. In the modem era, the public has become accustomed to look
to the ever-proliferating body of legislation and administrative rules and regulations
for standards and limitations of behavior; legislatures and agencies, state and federal,
have complied by regulating almost all conceivable aspects of behavior.
"' CL&K, LUSKEY & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 390; Rohan I, supra note 34, at 15-
16.
;2 Cf. Langbein, supra note 61, at 524-25, for a discussion of the lack of effect of
judicial doctrine on amateur will-makers.
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municated to anyone. 4' This diminishes the importance of the
"form as language" function. '44
Finally, to be dealt with in Part IV, the behavior which will
establish a declaration of trust is not necessarily as unstruc-
tured or "unchanneled" as some seem to assume from the ab-
sence of artificial legal formalities. The specter held out in
Richards that every imperfect gift would be turned into a dec-
laration of trust is a misleading overstatement. Perhaps Master
of the Rolls Jessel sensed from Morgan and Richardson that the
courts of equity were becoming trigger-happy in the use of the
new doctrine announced by Pye, and perhaps he was right. If
so, he unfortunately oversteered in his effort to correct the
course of the doctrine. The informal declaration of trust is not
lacking in form as would be the case if every imperfect gift
could be turned into one. To expose that form, Part IV will
examine the enigmatic trust concept, and attempt to link it to
the infinite variety of behavioral idiosyncracies and patterns
that mark these cases.
IV. IMPERFECT GIFTS AS TRUSTS
It has been suggested that the declaration of trust con-
struction of "gift" transactions has been avoided because of the
Richards rule, because of an overly legalistic and technical
view of the intent with which laymen act, and because of a
largely unfounded fear of undermining the formality of deliv-
ery. Assuming that courts moderated their application of the
Richards rule to give more thoughtful consideration to a decla-
ration of trust construction, they would then have to deal with
the puzzle presented by the trust concept. It is inherent in the
imperfect gift situation that the person who is alleged to have
made an inter vivos transfer did not think explicitly in terms
of a trust. Hence it will be necessary for the courts to have some
idea of a trust concept against which to measure diverse facts.
1,3 See note 29, supra, and accompanying text.
"I Of course, the absence of communication of the trust's existence is likely to
create serious evidentiary problems for a litigant trying to establish a declaration of
trust. See, e.g., Welch v. Henshaw, 49 N.E. 659, 660-61 (Mass. 1898); Raistrick's
Estate, 46 Pa. D. & C. 225, 227 (Orphans' Ct. 1942); In re Randall's Estate, 155
N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sur. Ct. 1956). Cf. Samuel v. Northern Trust Co., 340 N.E.2d 162 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (failure to communicate to anyone other than alleged beneficiary, trust
not upheld).
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This poses more difficulty than might appear, for the trust
concept is not readily adaptable to ordinary, everyday affairs.
In this section the trust concept will be examined in an effort
to identify what courts and lawyers who litigate cases should
be looking for, and some specific facts which may point to trust
intent will be suggested.
A. The Enigmatic Trust Concept
With a nod to Thurman Arnold's observation that "the
vice of definition" does not lead to understanding,"5 we must
look at least briefly at various attempts to define or describe
what a trust is.46 The Restatement, Second, of Trusts defines
an express trust'47 as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property, subjecting the person by whom the title to property
is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the
benefit of another person which arises as a result of a manifes-
tation of an intention to create it."'' Although this definition
can be broken down into several elements, 4 ' it would seem that
1 T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 33 (1937).
"I Those who have made the effort to verbalize a definition recognize the limita-
tions inherent in the task. Perhaps Maitland said it best:
Where judges and text-writers fear to tread, professors of law have to rush
in. I should define a trust in some such way as the following - When a person
has rights which he is bound to exercise upon behalf of another or for the
accomplishment of some particular purpose he is said to have those rights
in trust for that other or for that purpose and he is called a trustee.
It is a wide vague definition, but the best that I can make.
F. MATLAND, EQurrY 44 (2d ed. 1936).
"I The Restatement definition is not intended to comprehend constructive and
resulting trusts. Nor is this article concerned with delineating the contours of those
doctrines. Efforts have been made to frame a definition of the trust which is broad
enough to include these "implied by law" trusts. See Hart, What is a Trust?, 15 L.Q.
REv. 294 (1899); Lepaulle, An Outsider's View Point of the Nature of Trusts, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 52 (1928).
" RFSTATEMErr § 2, at 6. Thurman Arnold, who eschews definitions and the
definitional approach generally, commented critically on the definition given a trust
by the tentative draft of the first restatement, which is substantially the same as that
contained in the present restatement. He concluded that "when we are through with
the definitions and distinctions of the first fifty-six pages we have said in a great many
words that a trust is, after all, a trust." Arnold, supra note 8, at 808. Ereli similarly
finds the Restatement's definition of an express trust "circular and meaningless," in
the context of gratuitous dispositions of property. Ereli, supra note 13, at 192. Scott
responds to Arnold's criticisms in Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trust, 31
COLUM. L. Rsv. 1266 (1931).
" (1) a trust is a relationship; (2) it is a relationship of a fiduciary
character; (3) it is a relationship with respect to property, not one involving
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it is the intent - or rather manifested intent'50 - which brings
the trust to life. However, in explaining what that relationship
is which constitutes a trust, Scott, the reporter for the Restate-
ment, identifies no particular aspect that might conceivably be
related to manifested intent in a realistic sense. He can only
resort to vague phrases.
[Tihe trust is the whole of the juridical relationship, of
which the duties of the trustee are only one part. . . .The
trust is something more than the right or interest of the bene-
ficiary. The trust is the whole juridical device, the legal rela-
tionship between the parties with respect to the property
which is its subject matter, and includes not merely the du-
ties which the trustee owes to the beneficiary and to the rest
of the world, but also the rights, privileges, powers and im-
munities which the beneficiary has against the trustee and
against the rest of the world.'5 '
Bogert is at least succinct in his vagueness: "The whole bundle
of property, persons, rights and duties makes up the trust."', 2
There are a number of possible explanations for the eva-
siveness of the trust concept. Its historical evolution,5 3 the ap-
pearance of the term in the equitable remedy of the construc-
tive trust, 54 and the ascendancy in this century of the func-
merely personal duties; (4) it involves the existence of equitable duties im-
posed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the
benefit of another; and (5) it arises as a result of a manifestation of intention
to create the relationship.
1 Scorr § 2.3, at 38.
' 1 ScOrr § 2.8.
"' 1 Scorr § 2.4, at 38-39.
252 1 G. Bogert, supra note 11, at 1 n.1.
'3 See T. PLUCKNET, supra note 10, at 578-602.
"' Constructive trusts arise in a manner totally different from the trusts dealt with
in this article. All of the trusts treated here (formal express trusts, tentative trusts,
and the informal layman's trust) exist as a means of carrying out the intent of the
person who created the trust and because the person manifested an intent to create
it. In contrast, constructive trusts are imposed against the will of one who holds
property, on the theory that the party has either acquired the property wrongfully or
his retention of it would result in his unjust enrichment at the expense of someone else.
Because the constructive trust is by nature so different from express trusts, it is dealt
with principally in the Restatement of Restitution rather than the Restatement of
Trusts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1, comment e (1957). A third category of
trusts, resulting trusts, is so multi-faceted as to be difficult of both definition and
generalization. In some situations, it is hard to distinguish it from a constructive trust;
for example, when a purchase money resulting trust of realty is accompanied by the
transferee's oral promise to hold the property in trust for the person who pays the
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tional rather than conceptual approach to teaching trusts in
law schools ' all contribute to the present vacuum of under-
standing. Perhaps it is not important to have an understanda-
ble idea of the concept underlying the trust device when a
lawyer is drafting a trust instrument for a client, or when the
term is attached to a routine and frequently used device such
as the Totten trust. Everyone concerned generally understands
what is going on and why; there is no need to obfuscate the
matter by being concerned about the abstruse conceptuali-
zation of the mechanism which is being used.' S5
This taken-for-granted familiarity with the routine use of
the trust device as a vehicle for making gratuitous property
transfers both contributes to the difficulty of identifying the
essence of the trust and points the way out of the morass. When
the express trust device is deliberately used by a settlor, the
concept of the trust is adopted as a foregone conclusion; the
settlor intends to create whatever it is that is denominated by,
the word "trust." It is probably more accurate to say merely
that he consciously desires all the consequences that follow
from the conclusion that he has created one. The antecedent
proposition, that he manifested an intent to create it, is sup-
plied by the fact that he and his lawyer complied with all the
technical requirements necessary to create a valid one'57 and
labeled the end product a trust.
This process of trust creation cannot be transported to a
purchase price and the transferee fails to fulfill his promise. See 4 R. POWELL, supra
note 11, at 1 500; 5 id. at 1 592, 595. The most frequently articulated conceptuali-
zation of the resulting trust is that it is based upon an assumption or inference that
the person who holds title to property was not intended to have the beneficial interest
in it. 5 Scorr § § 404-404.2; 5 G. BOGFRT, TRUSTS AND TRus'rFas § § 451-70 (Rev. 2d
ed. 1977); RESTATzMENT § 404. See generally Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as
Express, Resulting and Constructive, 27 HARv. L. Rav. 437 (1914).
" Arnold, supra note 8, at 801-02 nn.3-5.
'I Arnold would apply this to all cases where the term "trust" is used. In his view,
a trust is "but a method of logical transportation after we have decided where we want
to go." Id. at 806.
I There must be trust property "of such a nature as to be the proper subject of a
trust." RESTATEMENT § 66. See generally id. § § 74-88. There must be a "proper benefi-
ciary." Id. § 66. See generally id. § § 112-31. If the settlor intends for someone other
than himself to be the trustee, the property must be conveyed to the trustee. See id. §
§ 31-34. If the trust property is land, in most states the Statute of Frauds requires that
the trust be manifested and proved by a written instrument. See id. § § 39-52. If the
settlor intends to create a testamentary trust, will formalities must be complied with.
See id. § § 53-57.
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situation where the antecedent intent is more amorphous or is
manifested under circumstances which do not involve explicit
use of the label, "trust." But this process of trust creation is
nonetheless instructive. In the context of gratuitous disposi-
tions of property, the mental processes of the settlor of a formal
express trust focus more precisely on the consequences of the
device rather than the device itself. And the critical conse-
quence, the primary focus of attention, is that the benefits of
ownership, in one form or another, either presently or in the
future, are shifted to another or others. Another consequence
that is by no means incidental is the imposition of duties on
the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary. Only if the trustee is subjected to duties can the
desire to transfer the benefits of ownership become a reality.
But it is suggested that the duties arise more as a by-product
of, or a necessary corollary to, the primary intent of transferring
something to the beneficiary.1
8
Section 25 of the Restatement, however, seems to push to
the forefront the element of the trustee's duties as the critical
element of intent that must be manifested in order to create
an express trust. It states, "No trust is created unless the set-
tlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."'59 In
conjunction with the Richards rule, which has made courts
loath to give serious consideration to the declaration of trust
construction in the first place, this section, if taken as the sine
qua non for the creation of a trust, would surely spell the doom
'" Cf. G. BOGERT, supra note 11, at 2 n.1 (emphasis added):
Many definitions of the trust seem concerned rather with the duty or obliga-
tion of the trustee, or the right of the cestui, than with the trust. The trust
in its modern sense is conceived to be the relationship or status in which are
concerned certain property and persons, and incidental to which are certain
rights and duties.
Similarly, one court has said, "He purported to set himself up as trustee. . . . Thus
assuming to act as trustee, he is held to have intended to take on those obligations
which are expressly set out in the instrument, as well as those fiduciary obligations
implied by law." Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ill. 1955) (emphasis added).
In Blackstone Canal Nat'l Bank v. Oast, 121 A. 223 (R.I. 1923), the transferor who was
held to declare a trust had done no more than establish a separate bank account in
his name as "agent." There were no obligations expressly set out anywhere. Other
evidence indicated he intended the account to benefit a Mrs. Stutt. The court stated,
"By changing the deposit, Daley voluntarily gave up his right as against the bank to
treat the fund as his own. Any withdrawal from the fund thereafter must be made,
not in his own right, but in the right and in the name of Mrs. Stutt." Id. at 225.
"I' RESTATEMENT § 25.
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of the existence of any declaration of trust other than a rather
formally created one expressly labeled a trust. It would almost
seem to require an express statement by the transferor to the
transferee to the effect that, "You can sue me if I interfere with
your property interests." This is highly unlikely to exist when
the transaction is obstensibly an undelivered gift and what the
transferor wants to do is to enable someone else to enjoy the
property. Yet some of the more recent cases involving imperfect
gifts have adopted this section as a description of the intent
which should be manifested in the facts before them in order
to sustain the trust argument. '
The emphasis on duties as the keynote of the trust's crea-
tion has also been troublesome when it has surfaced in cases
where thin, but formal, declarations of trust have been chal-
lenged as testamentary. If the settlor expressly reserves a full
complement of interests and powers, as is customary, the du-
ties he imposes on himself as trustee are practically nonexis-
tent. In Farkas v. Williams, 6' the court strove valiantly but
unconvincingly to concoct some situations which "might"'
' 2
give the beneficiary a cause of action against the settlor's estate
for breaches committed during the settlor's lifetime."3 An
identical instrument was at issue in Ridge v. Bright, 64 but the
court, while upholding the declaration of trust as nontestamen-
tary, emphatically declined to make the concept of
I" See, e.g., Hebrew Univ. Ass'n v. Nye, 169 A.2d 641, 644 (Conn. 1961) (citing
REsTATEmENT § 25); Frazier v. Hudson, 130 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. 1939) (citing RE-
STATEmENT § 25). Cf. Hansen v. Norton, 374 A.2d 230, 232 (Conn. 1977) (RFSTATEMENT
§ 25 is not explicitly cited, but strict manifestation of intent standard is applied).
"3 125 N.E.2d 600 (IIl. 1955).
'Z Id. at 608.
"3 The settlor expressly reserved the right, as trustee, to vote, sell, and redeem
the stock, but any sale or termination would operate as a pro tanto termination of the
trust. The settlor also reserved an unrestricted power to change the beneficiary and
revoke the trust, without specification as to the manner of exercise. The settlor's
exercise of the power would not be effective against the issuer of the stock unless
written notice was given to the issuer - a provision obviously inserted for the issuer's
protection and not for the purpote of restricting the settlor's control nor for enhancing
the interest of the beneficiary. Hence, the actions of the settlor which, according to
the court, might have given the beneficiary a cause of action against the settlor's estate
could conceivably be vulnerable to the defense that they instead manifested an intent
to revoke the trust. See RSTATEmNT § 330 and comment i. See also Langbein, supra
note 61, at 505 n.69, concluding for other persuasive reasons that "the cause of action
is improbable on the merits."
is 93 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1956).
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"enforceable duties" an element in its reasoning. It looked be-
yond the black letter formulation of section 25 to the context
in which it is asserted. The court concluded that it seemed
intended to mean only that "mere precatory words, generally
speaking, are not sufficient to manifest an intention to create
a trust."'115
The concept of enforceable duties which appears in section
25 of the Restatement was apparently designed to reflect the
preferred majority approach to the dilemma posed by a testa-
tor's attachment of precatory words to a bequest.' It does not
seem intended to be an all-pervasive, universal line of demar-
cation between manifestations of an intent sufficient to create
a trust and manifestations which are insufficient to create a
trust. Its ambit is limited. The topical heading for section 25
denotes "Precatory Words" as its subject, and its comments,
as well as those of Scott's treatise,"7 deal solely with the subject
of precatory words. Assuming that section 25 is only a guideline
for construing precatory words, it can hardly be transposed to
the very different situation of the declaration of trust, unless
one is prepared to argue that a statement such as "I hope that
" Id. at 612.
" The issue of trust creation by precatory words arises when an owner transfers
property, usually by will, with a polite request, often expressed as a "wish" or "hope,"
that the transferee use the property in a certain manner or for the benefit of someone
else. Early English and American cases quite routinely construed such bequests and
devises as trusts. 1 Scorr § 25.1. However, the majority of courts now approach lan-
guage of this nature more cautiously and refuse to impose a trust relationship on the
transfer unless the circumstances indicate that the testator intended to impose upon
his transferee a legal obligation to use the property in the manner specified. Id. § 25.2.
" See 1 Scorr §§ 25-25.2.
In section 24 of this treatise, however, Professor Scott appears to think that the
inquiry for an intention to impose duties plays a broader role than it might if restricted
primarily to cases involving precatory words.
The question in each case is whether the settlor manifested an intention to
create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as a trust, that is
to say, whether the settlor manifested an intention to impose upon himself
or upon the transferee of the property equitable duties to deal with the
property for the benefit of another person.
1 ScoTr § 24, at 192 (emphasis added). Perhaps it is significant that Scott chose the
phrase "equitable duties" rather than "enforceable duties." The former phrase has the
connotation of a softer emphasis on duties than does the latter. Indeed, Scott suggests
that it was so intended when he goes on to state that, "where the owner of the property
declares that he holds it for the benefit of another, this may be a sufficient manifesta-
tion of intention to create a trust ... although he does not use the word 'trust'." Id.
at 192-94.
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I will use this property for the benefit of B" can impose the
legal obligations of a trustee upon the utterer if spoken under
the appropriate circumstances.
The essence of the intent behind the trust creation in gra-
tuitous transfers is the intent to transfer the benefits of owner-
ship without the title and the responsibilities of legal owner-
ship.'"" This transfer of a beneficial interest is the most critical
consequence of use of the trust device. It is only natural that
the settlor's mind is focused most precisely upon this impor-
tant end result, rather than upon the trustee's numerous duties
or the complicated bundle of things which makes up the trust
entity.
We have come full circle and are back to the almost imper-
ceptible difference between an "intent" to transfer an equita-
ble interest and an "intent" to transfer complete ownership.
The contention previously set forth - that the differences be-
tween those two intents is a matter of legal abstractions having
little, if anything, to do with what actually goes on in the minds
of those untutored in the law'65 - should not be taken to mean,
however, that every expressed intent to transfer can or should
be labeled as an equitable transfer. Mere intent to transfer an
interest, potentially subject to being labeled an equitable inter-
est, is not enough. The intent must be manifested sufficiently
to allow a determination that the policy prerequisites for a
gratuitous transfer have been met. This entails a finding that
the cautionary and evidentiary functions of delivery have been
satisfied. For this reason, an oral statement of gift, without
more, would rarely suffice as an adequate declaration of
trust.'70 However, an oral statement of gift coupled with evi-
l" This viewpoint may seem inconsistent with that of the Restatement. Professor
Ereli makes the intriguing observation that Professor Scott and the Restatement are
attempting to limit the judicial use of the trust concept in the gratuitous property
disposition by viewing it as a wholly unique property relation. Ereli, supra note 13, at
191.
' See Part II, supra.
, See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 17 & n.62. Establishing a declaration
of trust solely on the basis of an oral declaration presents problems with both the
evidentiary and the cautionary function. Oral declarations are especially suspect, and
properly so, when they are testified to solely by the beneficiary. Cf. Forrest v. Forrest,
L.R. 34 Eq. 428, 433 (1865) ("There is not a tittle of evidence in support of a gift, except
the defendant's own oath.") Furthermore, there is the problem of the witness' recollec-
tion of the precise words used by the transferor. An alleged transferor's utterances
about transfers he is thinking about making in the future can so easily be remembered
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dence of subsequent conduct showing that the intent persists,
and that the speaker regarded his words as seriously spoken
and intended to have effect, may provide a sufficient eviden-
tiary basis for satisfying the underlying policy considerations.
In addition to providing a sufficient evidentiary basis for
weighing the policy considerations, the subsequent conduct of
one who purports to make a transfer has a unique importance,
in the imperfect gift cases, in shedding light on the appropriate
label for the intent that existed at the moment of the purported
transfer.' 7' Unlike a gift, a trust is an ongoing entity. In the
final analysis, this is perhaps the key for providing a focus for
the factual inquiry and a basis for distinguishing an incomplete
"gift" from a "trust." Once a gift is completed, the donor is
divorced from the property which was given and from the
donee. -A trust, on the other hand, continues as a
"relationship.' 72 Although the conceptual essence of a declara-
tion of trust at the moment of its creation is the giving of the
beneficial interest in the property,'7 3 the actuality of the trust
so declared or created is the ongoing status between the parties
and the property involved. It is virtually impossible to tell
later as more positive statements indicating that a benefit was immediately intended
to be conveyed to a listener who heard what he wanted to hear. See, for example, the
inconsistent testimony in McCaffrey v. North Adams Say. Bank, 138 N.E. 393 (Mass.
1922). This situation also lends itself to the possibility of coached testimony. Cf.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 22-23 (why coaching may be important). As for the
cautionary function, designed to assure a modicum of reflection and seriousness; Lang-
bein sums up the problem neatly in his critique of nuncupative wills: "[Tlalk is
cheap." Langbein, supra note 61, at 496 n.36.
"' Where that intent is ambiguous, there is ample authority that evidence of
subsequent statements and conduct is admissible and relevant to the question of
intent. Elliot v. Gordon, 70 F.2d 9, 13 (10th Cir. 1934); Adams v. Hagerott, 34 F.2d
899, 903 (8th Cir. 1929) (Such evidence "show[s] his interpretation of what had been
done."). However, if there is a written declaration of trust adopted by the settlor as a
complete expression of his intention, the parol evidence rule would exclude evidence
of subsequent as well as prior statements and conduct offered to prove a variance from
the written terms. RESTATEMENT § 38(4), comment a.
172 RESTATEMENT § 2.
113 "[Al trust may be defined as a transfer of property to one person to
be held or applied for the benefit of another. This would describe the usual
form of trust, but would not include the case of declarations of trust by which
the owner of property declares himself a trustee for another. In this case there
is no transfer of the legal title, but only of the equitable title. However, any
definitions along this line must be unsatisfactory in that they denote the act
by which a trust is created rather than the thing itself."
Long, The Definition of a Trust, 8 VA. L. REv. 426, 431 (1922). See Labatt, supra note
23, at 363.
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whether a person using words of "gift" intended an outright gift
or a transfer of an equitable interest. It is not so impossible to
determine whether, after purporting to make a transfer, that
person continued to regard the property completely or totally
as his own, and thus never perfected the intended gift, or
whether there was a continuing recognition that an interest (an
equitable one, and perhaps a future equitable one) had been
conveyed to the intended transferee.
B. The Trust Concept in Relation to Facts
In sifting facts for an indication of the declarer's continu-
ing recognition of the beneficial interest of another, the concept
of duties or obligations of the trustee - a concept which is an
integral part of the trust relationship - can be of aid. If the
alleged transferor followed an expression of gift with an ongoing
course of conduct which reveals that the transferor considered
himself under a duty to the beneficiary in dealing with the
property, the conclusion that the transaction was a declaration
of trust is strongly buttressed. However, indicia of self-imposed
duties should buttress or supplement evidence of an intent to
transfer, rather than being the sole point of inquiry.
There is no more vivid example of how this approach could
have been used than the case briefly described at the outset of
this work, Hebrew University Association v. Nye.174 To illus-
trate the point here, further factual details must be given. The
deceased transferor, Ethel Yahuda, was the widow of a distin-
guished Hebrew scholar. She had assisted him in collecting a
library of rare books and manuscripts. After his death in 1951,
the library became her property. Both of them had expressed
an interest in establishing a research center in Israel. To that
end, Mrs. Yahuda attempted to transfer the library to the
plaintiff university, but death cut short her efforts to catalog,
crate, and ship the books overseas to Israel. Her attempt came
dangerously, and needlessly, close to failing when the appellate
court overruled the trial court's finding that she had declared
herself trustee of the library for the university. The appellate
court could find "no facts even intimating that Ethel regarded
herself as trustee of any trust whatsoever, or as having assumed
" 169 A.2d 641 (Conn. 1961).
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any enforceable duties with respect to the property."17 5
The objective facts, the "manifestations" of Mrs. Ya-
huda's "intent," contain ample evidence that she acted consis-
tently for the benefit of the university and that she considered
herself duty-bound to protect its interest in the library. In the
first place, there was nothing half-hearted or tentative in her
expressed *desire that the university should have the library.
She announced the "gift" at a public luncheon in Israel, at-
tended by "many notables,"'76 including the president of Israel.
She approved an account of the "gift" in a newspaper release
and confirmed it to friends orally and in letters. In addition,
insofar as her duties with respect to the property are concerned,
the court's statement of facts reveals,
She refused offers of purchase and explained to others that
she could not sell the library because it did not belong to her
but to the plaintiff. On one occasion; when it was suggested
that she give a certain item in the library to a friend, she
stated she could not, since it did not belong to her but to the
plaintiff.'77
It is quite clear that Ethel Yahuda considered that she had
a self-imposed duty to protect the university's interest in the
library, the subject matter of the trust.178 Every action she took
with respect to it was taken for the benefit of the university.
True, she repeatedly used the word "gift" to describe her atti-
tude toward the transfer, but her words together with her ac-
tions are perfectly compatible with the notion that at the mo-
ment of transfer, the expressed intent comprehended the bene-
ficial interest, whether or not she consciously thought of the
" Id. at 644.
,"' Id. at 643.
1T7 Id.
" For other examples of cases where the facts provide a basis for conclusion that
the transferor considered himself under a duty with regard to the transferee's interest
in the property, see McCaffrey v. North Adams Say. Bank, 138 N.E. 393 (Mass. 1923)
(savings bank deposit; transferor promised, "I will never touch the principal."); Neal
v. Bryant, 235 S.W. 1075 (Mo. 1921) (transferor refused to rent or sell land which he
had "given" to his daughter); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (transferor
promised "not to interfere" with money set aside for his nephew in a bank account).
In all three cases, the court sustained a finding of a declaration of trust, but did not
rely specifically on this evidence or the duties concept. But see Young v. Young, 80
N.Y. 422 (1880) (transfer fails as a declaration of trust, even though the transferor,
when solicited for a loan, had said he might, with the transferees' consent, take some
of their bonds to make the loan).
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transaction in those terms. She retained legal title until such
time as a physical transfer could be effected, or, by implica-
tion, until her death. The evidentiary function of the formality
of delivery is certainly satisfied; there is not the slightest hint
that Mrs. Yahuda wanted anything other than that the library
should belong to Hebrew University. The public announce-
ment of the "gift" and .her approval of newspaper releases giv-
ing an account of it show that she was aware of the significance
of her words and actions, and that she intended for them to
have legal effect. Therefore, the cautionary function also is
satisfied.
The Nye court's conclusion that Ethel Yahuda "intended
to make . . .an executed, present legal gift inter vivos"17 is
reminiscent of Sir George Jessel's opinion in Richards;8 0 it
seems to have been arrived at by extracting Mrs. Yahuda's
words from the context of her actions. The court emphasized,
by the use of quotation marks, that her letters stated she "had
given" the library to the University.' 8' This apparently is the
unidentified factual basis for the court's conclusion.
The Nye court's obsession with the language used by the
transferor is not atypical. All too often courts look to spoken or
written words of the transferor and regard them as conclusive
of gift intent. This operates in almost every case against up-
holding the transaction. The layman is far more likely to use
words and phrases he knows, such as "give," "belong to," and
"are the property of," than express phrases of trust creation
with which he is unfamiliar. The judicial reaction to such lan-
guage is typified by the New York Court of Appeals in Young
v. Young:
The words of the donor in the present case are that the bonds
are owned by the donees .... No intention is here expressed
to hold any legal title to the bonds in trust for the donees.
... It could only be by reforming or supplementing the lan-
guage used, that a trust could be created .... 112
Ironically, courts have disregarded language in the occa-
sional case where a layman has used express words of trust in
"' 169 A.2d at 644.
"' See text accompanying notes 18-23, supra, for a discussion of the Richards
opinion.
,' 169 A.2d at 643.
" 80 N.Y. 422, 438-39 (1880).
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an informal document.'83 In these cases, it is quite correctly
seen that the words used do not necessarily reflect accurately
the state of mind of the speaker or the writer. That the word
"trust" was used or that the transferor described himself as a
"trustee" does not dictate a finding that a trust was created.
The hapless layman is unknowingly in a "damned if he does,
damned if he doesn't" predicament. If he does not use express
words of trust, courts will most often impute gift intent to him
because they do not know what actions might signify a trust;
on the other hand, when he does use trust expressions, courts
will disregard the language and look to other facts to find that
no trust was intended.'
84
A court which views the achievement of an owner's desires
with respect to disposition of property as one end to be sought
in administering the law should not let this goal become obfus-
cated by the appealing simplicity of the Richards rule. In Nye,
the court was more concerned with maintaining the integrity
of the gift concept and the purity of its own reasoning:
"[Tihere is a well-recognized distinction between a gift inter
vivos and a declaration of trust; a single transaction cannot be
both."' 5 Better that the Yahuda's library should be sold at an
estate auction to the highest bidder than that a court should
stoop to using the "fiction" of a declaration of trust to save an
imperfect gift.'86
'0 E.g., Ambrosius v. Ambrosius, 239 F. 473 (2d Cir. 1917); Govin v. De Miranda,
27 N.Y.S. 1049 (App. Div. 1894).
1, "[The decedent] was a layman, and may have been unaware of the legal
meaning and effect of the expression he used. ... Ambrosius v. Ambrosius, 239 F.
473, 476 (2d Cir. 1917). "Use in a will of the word 'trustee' by a lawyer may clearly
indicate that a trust is intended, but the same word written by one not learned in the
law, may have an entirely different meaning." Burton v. Irwin, 181 S.E.2d 624, 626
(Va. 1971).
169 A.2d at 645.
' The retrial ordered by the appellate court seemed to have only the slimmest
chance of salvaging the Yahudas' sincere desires. The appellate court overruled the
finding of the lower court that Mrs. Yahuda had declared a trust. In dictum, the court
also opined that the facts showed no manual delivery, nor any constructive delivery,
to support a gift. The appellate court surely knew that the library of rare books and
manuscripts would fall into the residuary of Mrs. Yahuda's estate, which under the
explicit directions of her will was to be liquidated to pay funeral expenses, debts, and
legacies; the excess was to be paid to trustees of a foundation in Israel established by
the will. Id. On retrial, however, the University managed to establish constructive
delivery by introducing new evidence of a memorandum which Mrs. Yahuda delivered
to the University at the time she announced the gift. 223 A.2d 397 (Conn. Super. Ct.
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Perhaps the readiness of courts to find that language is
determinative is indicative of the absence of any workable trust
concept other than the formal express trust. The manner in
which courts approach the issue indicates that they have no
firm idea of what they are looking for when they purport to look
for trust intent. Even those courts which have sustained imper-
fect gifts as declarations of trust are evasive in their reasoning.
Most, in the manner of Pye, Morgan, and Richardson, take
advantage of the elusive distinction between the transfer of an
equitable interest and the transfer of complete title and simply
conclude that an equitable interest was transferred. An excep-
tion to this is the Pennsylvania case of Estate of Smith,'7
which could easily have gone the way of most other cases had
the court seized upon the donor's written statement that "these
bonds I bought for, and are the property of, my nephew and
godson . ..and belong to him.""8 All of the other available
evidence was meticulously analyzed by the court in support of
its conclusion that the transferor had declared a trust of the
bonds in favor of his nephew. "Completeness of the trust is to
be judged of not only by what the testator said and what was
written, but by what the testator did."'85
The language used by the layman for the outward expres-
sion of his intention should be the least determinative eviden-
tiary factor in the search for intent. It has been a long standing
proposition that no particular words are necessary to create a
trust;'" the settlor need not know that the relationship he is
creating is called a trust, nor need he know the precise charac-
1966). That this one purely fortuitous fact should make a difference in the outcome
when the delivery issue controls is but another indication of how haphazard that
doctrine is. The added litigation expenses and the five-year delay in the University's
enjoyment of the library were needlessly imposed.
"' 22 A. 916 (Pa. 1891).
' Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 919. Other cases in which the court upheld a declaration of trust in spite
of rather explicit "gift" language used by the transferor are: Lynch v. Rooney, 44 P.
565, 566 (Cal. 1896) (" 'I resolved that he should have half of the estate. . . .I feel
that in justice it belongs to both of them . . . .' "); Barkley v. Lane's Ex'r, 69 Ky. (6
Bush) 587, 588-89 (1870) (" 'In my own handwrite I give, free of all charges, the within
note. . . .' "); McCaffrey v. North Adams Say. Bank, 138 N.E. 393, 394 (Mass. 1923)
(" 'Now I have deposited a thousand dollars . . . for your daughter Martha which I
give to her absolutely and it belongs to her and it's her money . . . .' "); Neal v.
Bryant, 235 S.W. 1075 (Mo. 1921) (" 'I have given you the Leazenby land, and it is
yours forever for your own personal benefit. . . .' ").
" RESTATEMENT § 24(2); PERRY ON TRUSTS § 112 (1874).
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teristics of the trust relationship. 9 ' But these assertions have
little meaningful substance in the imperfect gift cases since
courts are highly unlikely to find that a trust was created when
words of gift were uttered.
More important than the language spoken or written by a
transferor who is acting without legal advice is the way he deals
with the property, whether he continues to manifest an atti-
tude that the property, or some interest in it, is no longer bene-
ficially his. Where evidence of ongoing conduct or intent is
lacking, the manifestation of intention may well be tentative
and undeliberated.
Where the subject matter of the trust is income-producing
property, the fact that the transferor keeps an accounting of the
interest for the donee-beneficiary is a persuasive indication
that the transferor considers himself to be holding the property
for the benefit of the transferee. Because he does not regard the
property as belonging to himself, he naturally considers that he
should keep records and account to the beneficiary, in compli-
ance with one of the most fundamental duties imposed on trus-
tees.'9 2 It does no harm to the trust concept to acknowledge the
reality of the situation: the transferor assumed the duty to
account as the means of making tangible his desire to make
someone else the beneficial owner of the property. We need not
pretend that the transferor consciously and deliberately as-
sumed the duty to account and thereby created the trust.
The transferor's record keeping was one of the facts consid-
ered significant by the court in Estate of Smith.'9 3 The de-
ceased had made notations in his account book that interest on
some bonds was "collected for" his nephew;'94 that fact was also
noted in his pocket memorandum."15 Unfortunately, this oc-
currence was ignored in Flanders v. Blandy,"'9 in which a fa-
ther, purporting to make a gift to his daughter of $2000 in
bonds, sent accruing interest on the bonds to his daughter, and
also undertook to pay her interest when he reinvested the
fund.' The court relied primarily upon its view of the transac-
x" RTATEMNT § 23, comment a.
1t2 See RESTATEMENT § 172.
1" 22 A. 916 (Pa. 1891).
"I Id. at 918.
its Id.
" 12 N.E. 321 (Ohio 1887).
'" Id. at 321. The facts do not reveal whether he actually sent her the interest after
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tion as an intended gift, and application of the Richards rule,
as authority for refusing to construe the transaction as a trust.
Keeping accounts for the beneficiary is not necessarily suf-
ficient or conclusive in and of itself, however. Other evidence
may indicate that income which is sent to or allocated for the
beneficiary is all that is intended to be bestowed; the transferor
does not recognize an interest of the beneficiary or transferee
in the property which produced the income. 9' Or, as in Davis
v. National Bank of Tulsa,'99 the reason for the accounts may
be so unclear and the manner in which they are kept so confus-
ing that the transferor's intent must be questioned. There, a
father kept accounts for each of his children for a period of
about twenty-five years. The source of the original amount in
each of these accounts was the proceeds of sale of stock regis-
tered in the respective names of the children. These funds were
first kept in separate bank accounts for each child, but the
father closed the accounts and mingled the funds with his own
assets. His bookkeeping was not thorough; the accounts re-
quired auditing after his death because of a "dearth of descrip-
tive notation."2 He also charged the accounts with "large and
substantial amounts" for himself and his wife" ' and instructed
an employee not to divulge information about the accounts to
the children."°2 Several years before his death, he ceased mak-
ing entries in one account and balanced out the others. Al-
though the court disposes of the declaration of trust argument
under the rubric of the Richards"°3 rule, the result seems cor-
the fund was reinvested. Cf. Loop v. Des Autell, 293 N.W. 738 (Mich. 1940) (deceased's
retention of income from the property was a factor in the court's finding against the
existence of trust intent).
"I For example, in Hitch v. Davis, 3 Md. 266 (1851), the alleged transferor sent
his daughter the interest on a mortgage note as it was paid. However, the evidence that
he intended for her to have the principal was slim and ambiguous; the payments of
interest could be explained as intended to compensate her for the privilege of cutting
wood from the subject land, a privilege she had enjoyed prior to its sale by her father;
her father's will left everything to her in trust, for life, refuting the likelihood of an
intention for her to have the principal outright, and revealing that the father was
familiar with the trust device. Although Professor Bogert cites this case as an example
of a court's proper refusal to construe an imperfect gift as a trust, the declaration of
trust argument was neither pressed by the daughter nor given lengthy consideration
by the court. See BOGERT, supra note 11, § 205 at 373 n.79.
"1 353 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1960).
Id. at 485.
I d.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 488-89.
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rect; the father did not sustain a course of conduct indicating
that his dealings with the fund were solely for the children's
benefit, and he refused a specific recommendation from his
accountant to establish trusts for his children.
More difficult to deal with are the cases - and they are
numerous - in which the full enjoyment of the property is not
to commence until the death of the transferor. These transfers
are rarely upheld as gifts, unless there has been a delivery of
the property to a third party who can be labeled a "trustee"
for the donee rather than an "agent" for the donor.2 4 The deliv-
ery of the property to a third party "trustee" is a relinquish-
ment of control over the property by the donor. In the imperfect
gift cases, however, the transferor often indicates, expressly or
impliedly, that he wishes to retain the income for his life, and
in some cases there is expressed the possibility that he might
need the property itself.25 When this situation is the case, it is
highly unlikely that the owner will part with possession of the
property and therefore improbable that the facts will support
a finding of delivery. As noted above, however, it is quite possi-
ble, and routinely valid, to carry out desires such as this
through the formal declaration of trust device, reserving powers
and interests to the settlor.211 Outside of this context, however,
an expressed reluctance to part absolutely with the property
prior to death has been fatal to the transaction in most cases.
The transferor's desire to retain an interest to guard against
unforeseen contingencies, or the retention of the income for life,
gives the attempted transfer strong testamentary overtones,
"I E.g., Trubey v. Pease, 88 N.E. 1005 (Ill. 1909); Barnum v. Reed, 26 N.E. 572
(Ill. 1891). For a thorough discussion of the problem of delivery to a third party, see
Mechem, supra note 13, at 586-601. As for the appropriate legal label for describing
the capacity in which the third party acts in receiving delivery, Mechem contends that
"trustee" is the most accurate. Id. at 586. Others caution that the term is not being
used in its literal sense here. CLARK, LUSKY & MuapaY, supra note 8, at 427.
20 The common concern which leads many donative-minded people to hedge their
gifts to guard against unforseeable future needs was expressed by one transferor's
statement that, "A person doesn't like to give their shoes away until they're through
wearing them." In re Hogue's Will, 6 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939).
"I E.g., United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (D. Ark. 1946);
Estate of Brenner, 547 P.2d 938 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d
600 (ll. 1955); Ridge v. Bright, 93 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1956); Lamkin v. Robinson, 16
Ohio App. 440 (1922); Knagenhjelm v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 114 A. 5 (R.I.
1921); Samuell v. Brooks, 207 S.W. 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
[Vol. 67
1978-79] DECLARATIONS OF TRUST
causing courts to evoke the statute of wills as an additional
reason for holding the gift invalid.0 7
Nevertheless, construing the transaction as a declaration
of trust does not seem inappropriate when the transferor took
affirmative steps to assure the security of the interest which he
wished the transferee to enjoy in the future."' In Gannon v.
McGuire,05 for instance, the deceased was reported to have
said, "I am taking this [a bond and mortgage executed by the
transferees] to keep for you, and put it in a place of safekeep-
ing, so when I die you shall have this property free and clear of
any encumbrance. 2 10 Similarly, in Shea v. Crofut,211 the de-
ceased transferor, who had difficulty getting about, asked an
acquaintance to rent a safe deposit box specifically for the
purpose of holding a package of bonds and coupons with the
transferee's name written upon it. In both cases the property
remained in a place of safekeeping until the transferor's death
and both courts acknowledged that there was no doubt that the
intention to transfer the property was genuine. Nevertheless,
both transactions were construed as intended gifts unperfected
by delivery which could not be perfected by construing them
as declarations of trust. 12 The facts, however, show subsequent
2 E.g., Eschen v. Steers, 10 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1926); Noble v. Learned, 94 P. 1047
(Cal. 1908); Warden's Estate v. Pelling, 20 N.E.2d 143 (111. App. Ct. 1939); Talcott v.
American Bd. of Comm'rs for Foreign Missions, 205 Ill. App. 339 (1917); First & Tri-
State Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Caywood, 176 N.E. 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931); Brown
v. Crafts, 56 A. 213 (Me. 1903); Buchwald v. Buchwald, 199 A. 800 (Md. 1938); Detroit
Bank v. Bradfield, 36 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1949); Conrad v. Douglas, 61 N.W. 673
(Minn. 1894); Godard v. Conrad, 101 S.W. 1108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907); In re Randall's
Estate, 155 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Courtney's Will, 258 N.Y.S. 177 (App.
Div. 1932); Beck v. Staudt, 133 N.Y.S. 529 (App. Div. 1912), aff'd per curiarn 101 N.E.
1095 (1913); Ratcliff v. Lee, 192 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1948). But see, sustaining the transfer
as declaration of trust despite strong testamentary overtones, American Bible Soc'y
v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 17 P.2d 105 (Cal. 1932); Cooey v. Cooey, 182 So. 202 (Fla. 1938)
(dictum); DeLeuil's Ex'rs v. DeLeuil, 74 S.W.2d-474 (Ky. 1934); Barkley v. Lane's
Ex'r, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 587 (1869); McCaffrey v. North Adams Say. Bank, 138 N.E. 393
(Mass. 1923); Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 89 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1905).
"" See RwsTATEMENT § 176 (trustee's duty to safeguard the subject matter of the
trust); DeLeuil's Exr's v. DeLeuil, 74 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1934) (transferor's placing of
property in safety deposit box a manifestation of trust intent, even though his actions
also indicate he reserved income for life).
2" 47 N.Y.S. 870 (App. Div. 1897).
"I, Id. at 871.
211 196 N.Y.S. 850 (App. Div. 1922).
"I2 On appeal, the Gannon case was reversed. The high court found that the gift
was complete because delivery was present. 160 N.Y. 475 (1899). This holding, how-
ever, does not alter the distinction drawn here between gifts and declarations of trust.
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conduct of the thwarted "donors" fully consistent with the in-
tent to declare a trust.
2
1
3
Another indication that the transferor recognizes an ongo-
ing interest of the transferee in the property, perhaps to be
enjoyed in the future, is his segregation of the subject matter
from his own property.214 Segregation signals that the transferor
regards himself as having a relationship to the trust property
that is different from other property that he claims as his own.
In Young v. Young,215 the transferor purported to make a gift
of bonds to his two sons, retaining the income interest. This
was evidenced by oral statements before witnesses and by a
written memorandum. The transferor lived with one of his
sons. There was a safe in the home. After the purported trans-
fer, the bonds were normally kept in the son's compartment of
the safe, rather than in the pigeon-hole where the father kept
his personal papers. They were in the son's compartment at the
father's death. Even though the court wanted to uphold the
transfer25 and cleared the way to do so by ably refuting a strong
213 In Shea, as in a number of other cases, the court states that the declaration of
trust construction cannot be upheld unless the evidence " 'admit[s] of no other
interpretation.' "Id. at 854. This insistence seems to be unwarranted when the ambi-
guity is that between a gift and a trust. Whichever "intent" exists, the end desired by
the owner is essentially the same: to transfer the benefit of owning property to another.
The principle of effectuating an owner's intent should apply equally to all of the legal
devices which will bring about this end; none should be less favored by the law than
another. When the evidence admits of interpretation as either an intended gift or an
intended trust, and the gift is incomplete, the only interpretation that is consistent
with the underlying principle is that of a trust. There are no counterbalancing princi-
ples operative which would require holding against the existence of a trust just because
the evidence is also consistent with a gift construction. Cf. Roe v. Tranmer, 95 Eng.
Rep. 694 (K.B. 1757) ("Certainly it is more considerable to make the intent good in
passing the estate, if by any legal means it may be done, than, by considering the
manner of passing it, to disappoint the intent and principal thing, which was to pass
the land."), quoted in A. CAsNER & W. LEAcH, CASES AND TEXT ON PnoPER 376 n.10
(1951). The editors remark that this modem approach "was not uniformly adhered to
by later generations of judges." Id.
211 See RESTATEMENT § 179 (trustee's duty to keep trust property separate); Black-
stone Canal Nat'l Bank v. Oast, 121 A. 223 (R.I. 1923) (the opening of a separate bank
account, in the name of transferor as "agent," was one of the factors relied on in
sustaining a finding of trust intent). Cf. Stuart v. Sargent, 186 N.E. 649 (Mass. 1933)
(not a gratuitous transfer situation; segregating stock certificates and identifying them
by beneficiary's name sufficient evidence to uphold finding of trust declared by broker-
age firm).
211 80 N.Y. 422 (1880).
21, Id. at 430.
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argument that the transfer was testamentary, 217 it could not
find a handle for the question of trust intent; the attempted gift
was yet another needless victim of the Richards rule.
218
Another element which should bear on the question of in-
tent is the relationship between the parties. Was the relation-
ship such that it would be natural for the-transferor to retain
legal title and possession in order to manage the property
rather than conveying both legal and beneficial title to the
transferee? Courts almost universally speak of retention of pos-
session as indicative of a tentative frame of mind. However,
retention of possession is normal behavior for an owner who
views himself as trustee. When the person who desires and
attempts to make a transfer is in the role of provider and man-
ager of property for the person to whom the transfer is made,
it is perfectly natural that the mode of transfer selected would
be one that continued the respective roles, whether the motiva-
tion for this be benevolent paternalism or just plain habit.
Thus, in the paradigmatic case, Estate of Smith, the court
deemed it significant that the transferee was a thirteen year old
child who had resided for ten years with the transferor, his
uncle. 29 The court said, "His uncle admittedly stood in loco
parentis, which would seem to furnish a sufficient motive for
217 Id. at 431.
" Id. at 438-39. See also Moore v. Layton, 147 Md. 244, 127 A. 756 (Md. 1925)
(Uncle removed bonds from his private bank box and handed them to nephew with
instructions to put them where nephew could find them. If anything happened to the
uncle, nephew was to have the bonds. Bonds remained segregated, but uncle, with
nephew's knowledge, clipped coupons and collected interest until his death. Held: No
declaration of trust; intent was testamentary). Cf. Warden's Estate v. Pelling, 20
N.E.2d 143 (111. App. Ct. 1939) (Uncle removed notes from private bank box, endorsed
them to nephew, and handed them to bank official to keep in a separate bank vault.
Nephew based claim solely on gift theory. Held: No complete gift; in dictum, court
refuses to uphold incomplete gift as declaration of trust). But see Hamer v. Sidway,
27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (Declaration of trust sustained, even though transferor did
not segregate specific property. However, he had written in a letter to the transferee,
his nephew, that he "had the money in the bank," and "[did not] intend to interfere
with this money in any way." Id. at 258.)
"1I 22 A. 916 (Pa. 1891). Even Professor Scott, a stem adherent to the Richards
rule, "confesses" that the facts in Estate of Smith appear to him to suggest a declara-
tion of trust rather than an incomplete or testamentary gift. Scott, The Restatement
of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUm. L. Rv. 1266, 1283 (1931). He arrives at this conclusion
apparently on the basis of his viewing the actions and words of the testator as equiva-
lent to a declaration that the property was being held "for the benefit of" the nephew.
See I Scorr § 24, at 192-94 & 194 n.2.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
making this disposition of the bonds ....
Even when the relationship is not augmented by an in loco
parentis interpretation, it is not the least uncommon for an
older relative to have a paternalistic attitude toward kin of a
younger generation. This is aptly illustrated by a letter written
by one transferor to his twenty-one year old nephew:
Now, Willie I do not intend to interfere with this money in
any way till I think you are capable of taking care of it and
the sooner that time comes the better it will please me. I
would hate very much to have you start out in some adven-
ture that you thought all right and lose this money in one
year.Y'
,The same consideration should also be given to attempted
transfers between husband and wife and where one (usually the
husband) has been in the role of provider or property manager
for the other.2= Of course, the relationships which lend them-
selves to fiduciary-like behavior on the part of one party to
another are by no means limited to relationships which have
the imprimatur of legal or blood bindings. Facts in individual
cases should be approached with a sensitivity to the possible
existence of a relationship that supports a trust construction.
In what is by far the largest number of the imperfect gift
cases, the property that is allegedly the subject of the gift is
still in the possession of the transferor at his death. Typically,
after purporting to make a transfer, the transferor says or does
nothing that is inconsistent with a continuing recognition of
the transferee's interest in the property.2m It is intact and avail-
20 22 A. at 918.
n' Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
2n E.g., Cartell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 153 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1941) (Hus-
band repeatedly stated to third parties that certain corporate notes, payable to bearer,
belonged to his wife. He gave instructions to make the interest checks payable to her.
However, he never told her of his intent for the notes to belong to her, and he was the
sole manager of the property, even to the extent of cashing the interest checks payable
to her. Held: No declaration of trust).
2 Of course, it may be difficult to find a declaration of trust if the transferor's
actions do not go beyond passive noninterference or noncontradiction. However, there
are rare cases where the facts surrounding the initial transfer are sufficient to satisfy
both the cautionary and evidentiary function. In Ginn's Adm'x v. Ginn's Adm'r, 32
S.W.2d 971 (Ky. 1930), the transferor had stated in judicial proceedings that he wanted
certain stocks and bonds which he had inherited as the intestate successor to his late
wife to go to their infant daughter. Subsequently, he married and had two more
children. When he died, his surviving second wife claimed the property was in his
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able for the beneficiary at the transferor's death; as trustee, the
transferor fulfilled the essence of his fiduciary responsibilities.
Occasionally, however, the owner, after purporting to
make a transfer, disposes of the property or otherwise commits
acts which would be breaches of his fiduciary duty if he is held
to have declared a trust. Actions which would be major
breaches of trust, such as selling all or part of the subject mat-
ter, tend to indicate that the transferor's intent was tentative
and that he did not in fact recognize a continuing interest of
the beneficiary in the property. Actions which are grossly in-
consistent with a trustee's duties are perhaps properly seen as
negating the existence of trust intent at the moment of the
purported transfer. This was the court's view in Ambrosius v.
Ambrosius. 4 The transferor, acting without legal advice, ex-
pressly purported, in writing, to hold certain securities in trust
for his young daughter. The court emphasized that his later
actions were inconsistent with his words in that he failed to
account to his daughter for the income, sold some of the securi-
ties, and pledged some as loan security.2
An interesting counterpoint to Ambrosius is the case of
Knagenhjelm v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.22 Mentioned in
estate, arguing that the transferor had made an incomplete gift to his daughter, now
ten years old. The court sustained a claim that her father had made a declaration of
trust. From a functional standpoint, statements made and recorded in a judicial pro-
ceeding are more reliable evidence than conversational statements and also are likely
to be made with more forethought, deliberation, and intention to have meaning. The
father-daughter relationship in this case, and the tender years of the daughter in
particular, provide the basis for the probable existence of trust intent.
239 F. 473 (2d Cir. 1917).
2u Id. at 476. See Govin v. De Miranda, 27 N.Y.S. 1049 (App. Div. 1894) (bonds
purportedly held in trust but disposed of by transferor prior to death. Held: no declara-
tion of trust).
Compare the questionable holdings of declaration of trust in In re Horkan's Estate,
214 N.W. 438 (Wis. 1927), and Thompson's Exr'x v. Thompson, 226 S.W. 350 (Ky.
1920). In neither case were express words of trust used, and in both cases the intent to
recognize an interest in another, if it ever firmly existed, had'clearly dissipated before
the death of the alleged transferor. The transferor's actions constituted major breaches
of trust. Yet in both cases the court found declarations of trust which were irrevocable
because the power to revoke had not been expressly reserved. Scott cites Thompson
as a case in which the evidence "seems clear that the intention was to make a gift,
which failed for want of delivery of the subject matter of the gift." 1 Scorr § 31, at
244 & n.2. Scott's suggestion that the case was wrongly decided is correct, but his
reason is superficial and inadequate under the analysis of imperfect gifts proposed
here.
- 114 A. 5 (R.I. 1921).
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the introduction, Knagenhjelm involved the childless, wealthy
lawyer, Mr. Davis, who signed a written declaration that he
held 497 shares of stock in trust for a young woman. His deal-
ings with the property were in many respects similar to those
of the transferor in Ambrosius. He did not account to the bene-
ficiary for the interest, although he did send her an annual
allowance and reportedly took the dividends on the stock into
account when so doing. More importantly, he dealt with the
principal in a manner inconsistent with her interests. He had
not reserved a power to revoke the trust, but on the written
declaration, he struck out the designation of "497" shares and
replaced it with "447;" only 422 shares remained in the enve-
lope at his death. Twenty-five shares had been given to his
butler."'
The beneficiary prevailed in her claim for the 422 shares
against the administrator of the transferor's estate. There was
no doubt about the genuineness of her claim or the sincerity of
the transferor's expressed desire. What is interesting, although
not surprising, is that the question of whether this transaction
could properly be called a trust did not even arise. Because the
transferor was a sophisticated lawyer, everyone simply as-
sumed that he did intend to create a trust. Knagenhjelm illus-
trates that the advantages of the use of the declaration of trust
have been reserved to those who are sophisticated in their
knowledge of the law, or those who are wealthy enough to pur-
chase the services of someone who is. The creation of the trust
is telegraphed to the courts by the proper use of the correct
legal term. Happily, the court need not wrestle with the diffi-
cult problem of what constitutes trust intent. Since Richards,
this problem has also been avoided in the cases of laymen's
transfers, unfortunately at the cost of the validity of the trans-
action.
Although the court in Knagenhjelm did not seriously ques-
tion whether the transaction before it was properly called a
trust, it did reveal some discomfort about the actions of the
transferor, even though the beneficiary wisely waived any
claim to the 75 missing shares. Ultimately, the court con-
cluded that the transferor's actions subsequent to the declara-
2n Id. at7.
= Id.
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tion of trust "appear to be technical breaches of trust, rather
than an attempted repudiation or denial of the trust."'2, To call
giving 25 shares away to a butler a "technical breach" may
stretch the meaning of the word "technical." Nevertheless, the
court's approach to the settlor's subsequent conduct has valid-
ity and can be carried over to the imperfect gift cases. Actions
which are in contradiction of a trustee's duties but which do
not result in loss to the beneficiary (such as failure to segregate
the trust subject matter from the transferor's own property)
could, it seems, be called technical breaches which do not nec-
essarily negate or contradict a conclusion that the transferor
regarded himself as trustee.sss
Another alternative which is more expansive but perhaps
doctrinally more difficult is that of implying, from the circum-
stances of the trust's creation, the settlor's reservation of a
power to revoke. This implication would make it possible to
recognize an interest of the beneficiary in remaining property
when only some of it has been disposed of by the transferor
prior to his death, assuming that the partial disposition of the
property was regarded as a pro tanto revocation of the trust.
The doctrinal difficulty stems from the general rule that the
power to revoke must be specifically reserved by the trust's
terms.23' Of course, the kinds of trusts we are concerned with
here would rarely, if ever, have a complete set of terms in
writing; where this is the case, the "inference" is that the trust
is irrevocable .
2
However, the inference usually is reversed to one of revoca-
bility in the case of Totten trusts,23 and there is a marked
parallel between Totten trusts and the unelaborate, informal
sort of trust that might exist in an imperfect gift case, particu-
larly in the manner in which they arise. Gulliver and Tilson
2" Id. at 8.
2 Bingen v. First Trust Co., 103 F.2d 260, 264 (8th Cir. 1939) (intent to declare
trust found and even though several of transferor's actions constituted breaches of
trust, they did not indicate intent to repudiate trust). Cf. Loco Credit Union v. Reed,
516 P.2d 1112 (N.M. 1973) (not an "imperfect gift" fact situation; trust intent found
despite trustee's act of pledging trust property as security for a loan).
' RESTATEmENT § 330.
2 RESTATEmmT § 330, comment c.
2" 1 Scowt § 58.1, at 520; RESTATE ENT § 58, comment a. As to methods of revoca-
tion of a Totten trust, see RESTATEmENT § 58, comment c. The methods of revocation
are discussed and critiqued in Estes, supra note 74.
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viewed the absence of legal advice as an important considera-
tion in rationalizing the presumption that the Totten trust is
intended to be revocable.
The usual inter vivos trust is customarily set out in a detailed
written document, to the content and terms of which the
settlor and his attorney will normally have devoted much
time and thought . . . . It is reasonable to assume that the
omission of a power of revocation in such a carefully prepared
document was intentional, and therefore to adopt a general
principle that an inter vivos trust is irrevocable unless a
power of revocation is expressly reserved. . . . But the situa-
tion of a bank deposit is quite different. The trust is not
stated in any detail, its express terms being confined to the
form of the account, sometimes expanded briefly in a supple-
mentary agreement with the bank. There is, therefore, not
the same factual basis for the application of ordinary doc-
trines of interpretation of trust instruments, and the court
has much more justification for implying terms of the trust.'
A person whose words and actions satisfy the cautionary
and evidentiary functions and sufficiently establish that he
regarded himself as the trustee of the property for another,
except for the action of partially disposing of the property, does
not seem to be appreciably different from the depositor of a
22 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 37-38. Gulliver and Tilson's assumption
about the legal-profession's counseling is borne out by one lawyer's description of how
he goes about counseling a client who is contemplating the creation of an irrevocable
inter vivos trust:
I listen to him, question him until he is about to get annoyed at me, scratch
my head, walk twice around the block, utter three prayers, knock wood,
whistle, take two drinks of scotch and then make a long list of all the reasons
why the client should not do it, and go at him again .... I cannot empha-
size too much the advisability of extremely careful forethought before creat-
ing an irrevocable trust, particularly one covering type of property which
may be unduly difficult to manage if in a trust.
R. WonMSER, THEoRY AND PRACTICE OF ESTATE PLMANNG 80,82 (1946), quoted in TRusTs
IN MwcENTuRy: TANSrION, TAXATION AND TRENDS 124 (1977) (Section of Real Prop-
erty, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association). As Wormser suggests,
and as some cases reflect, e.g., Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.
1966), the consequences of irrevocability for the still living settlor who wishes to regain
control of the funds can be, at best, uncomfortable and, at worst, devastating. Courts
have nevertheless applied the inference of irrevocability harshly, and with sometimes
questionable results, in some cases of express trusts implied from the actions of un-
counseled lay persons. See, e.g., Thompson's Exr'x v. Thompson, 226 S.W. 350 (Ky.
1920); In re Horkan's Estate, 214 N.W. 438 (Wis. 1927). See note 245, supra, for a
discussion of these two cases,
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savings apcount trust who makes withdrawals prior to death.
Given the normal absence of legal advice in these gift transac-
tions, the circumstances surrounding them should be examined
for the existence of factors that might suggest that the trans-
feror intended to reserve a power to revoke the trust. If the
property involved was substantial, the transferee was a pri-
mary or sole object of the transferor's affection and generosity,
and the. later disposition of the property was solely for the
purpose of meeting personal needs of the transferor rather than
a frivolous or whimsical expenditure, the fact that it would
have been extremely improvident to have declared a trust with-
out reserving a power of revocation would justify a finding that
the transferor did intend to reserve that power."5 Besides such
indirect indications leading to an inference that the power of
revocation was reserved, more explicit evidence, such as a
statement made by the transferor that "I may need this later,"
written in a letter or spoken at the time of the transaction, is
virtually the equivalent of the reservation of the power to re-
voke and should be considered as part of the terms of the trust.
Perhaps it should be emphasized that no suggestion is
being made that a general rule should be adopted, as it has
been for Totten trusts in most jurisdictions, preferring an infer-
ence of revocability for all declarations of trust which arise
from imperfect gift situations. In the first place, the very fact
that the property has been totally or partially disposed of by
the transferor (and these are the only cases where the power of
revocation issue should matter) is very relevant to the initial
question of whether a trust was declared at all. Opting for an
automatic inference of revocability would suggest that any
later disposition of the property was properly made pursuant
to the power of revocation. This in turn poses the danger that
insufficient attention might be paid to the all important initial
question, involving weighing the evidence in light of the cau-
tionary and evidentiary functions, of whether a trust was de-
clared.
Secondly, such a general inference would be inconsistent
with the general purpose of this article. No attempt has been
"2 See RESTATEMENT § 330, comment c. The Restatement enumerates several other
factors which might bear on the question of whether the power of revocation was
intended to be reserved. See id.
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made to establish a new "category" of trusts with its own
unique or deviant rules. The dual purpose has been more lim-
ited: first, to rid the approach to imperfect gift cases of some
assumptions which have needlessly led to the judicial overrul-
ing of an owner's expressed desires, and second, to infuse this
area of the law with a special sensitivity to the position of the
lay population which desires of the law not that its rules and
doctrines be easy to understand but that they be fair for all.
CONCLUSION
For over a century, the doctrine of delivery has haunted
the law of inter vivos gratuitous transfers. A sense of deep
frustration is engendered when an attempted gift, clearly in-
tended by the owner of property, is struck down by judicial
decree after the owner is deceased and it is beyond his power
to remedy his failure to comply with legal dictates. One solu-
tion to the problem is wholesale abandonment of the delivery
doctrine. But the slow process of change in common law doc-
trines seems unlikely to produce such a cataclysmic reorienta-
tion of a venerable rule, especially in the absence of public
pressure or of obvious changes in the external social and eco-
nomic structure rendering the rule outmoded. This article,
therefore, has proposed that existing trust law offers at least a
partial solution, or perhaps an intermediate one. It has at-
tempted to lay a foundation and sketch a framework for an
increased reliance by courts on the declaration of trust con-
struction of the gratuitous transaction, particularly in those
cases where the subject of the gift is personalty. This approach
will not eliminate every instance of frustrated intent, but it can
validate some gratuitous transfers which should be upheld. In
the words of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, "The cause why there
is a chancery is, for that mens actions are so divers and infinite,
that it is impossible to make any general law which may aptly
meet with every particular act, and not fail in some circum-
stances." 16 Construing imperfect gifts as declarations of trust
represents still another fulfillment of the synergistic relation-
ship between equity and the trust.
Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch. 1615).
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